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Dergiler / International Review of Economics and Management / 2016 / Cilt: 4 - Sayı: 1

INCENTIVE ROOTS OF MANAGERIAL (EXCESSIVE) RISK TAKING AND AN ASSESMENT OF POLICY RESPONSES

Sadettin Haluk ÇİTÇİ
Sayfa
29–44
Yayın Tarihi
2016-04-07
DOI
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⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

The paper also assesses main policy responses against excessive risk taking and concludes that current policies centered on fixing contractual schemes are not adequate to fix these incentive problems.

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

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Amaç & Hipotez:There are many incentive factors affecting managers’ risk appetite.
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Temel Bulgular & Veri:This study reviews the incentive literature and analyses arguments highlighting the impact of implicit and explicit incentives on managerial risk taking and the results of empirical studies on the issue.
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Sonuç & Katkı:The paper also assesses main policy responses against excessive risk taking and concludes that current policies centered on fixing contractual schemes are not adequate to fix these incentive problems.
🔬Tür:Literatür & Derleme Çalışması
📍Kapsam:Genişletilmiş Akademik Örneklem
⚙️Değişkenler:Incentives · Risk taking · Investment

Özet

There are many incentive factors affecting managers’ risk appetite. This study reviews the incentive literature and analyses arguments highlighting the impact of implicit and explicit incentives on managerial risk taking and the results of empirical studies on the issue. The paper also assesses main policy responses against excessive risk taking and concludes that current policies centered on fixing contractual schemes are not adequate to fix these incentive problems.

Abstract

There are many incentive factors affecting managers’ risk appetite. This study reviews the incentive literature and analyses arguments highlighting the impact of implicit and explicit incentives on managerial risk taking and the results of empirical studies on the issue. The paper also assesses main policy responses against excessive risk taking and concludes that current policies centered on fixing contractual schemes are not adequate to fix these incentive problems.

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Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

ÇİTÇİ, S. H. (2016). INCENTIVE ROOTS OF MANAGERIAL (EXCESSIVE) RISK TAKING AND AN ASSESMENT OF POLICY RESPONSES. International Review of Economics and Management, Cilt: 4 - Sayı: 1, 29–44. https://ajindex.com/articles/769719

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Kaynakça (17)

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