Dergiler / Öneri Dergisi / 1996 / Cilt: 1 - Sayı: 5

RANT ARAMA VE X ETKİNSİZLİĞİ

Sayfa
145–149
Yayın Tarihi
1996-06-01
DOI
—
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⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

The possibility of an overlap between these two measures is examined. in particular the paper addresses a problem of measure Identification which highlights the need to reconsider the normative microfoundations of rent-seeking.

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

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Amaç & Hipotez:This paper discusses the social çost of monopoly with special attention given to the geometric representation of that social cost, notably rent-seeking and X-inefficiency.
📊
Temel Bulgular & Veri:This paper discusses the social çost of monopoly with special attention given to the geometric representation of that social cost, notably rent-seeking and X-inefficiency.
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Sonuç & Katkı:The possibility of an overlap between these two measures is examined. in particular the paper addresses a problem of measure Identification which highlights the need to reconsider the normative microfoundations of rent-seeking.
🔬Tür:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Kapsam:Genişletilmiş Akademik Örneklem
⚙️Değişkenler:Rant Arama · X Etkinsizliği

Özet

This paper discusses the social çost of monopoly with special attention given to the geometric representation of that social cost, notably rent-seeking and X-inefficiency. The possibility of an overlap between these two measures is examined. in particular the paper addresses a problem of measure Identification which highlights the need to reconsider the normative microfoundations of rent-seeking.

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Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

SOYAK, M. (1996). RANT ARAMA VE X ETKİNSİZLİĞİ. Öneri Dergisi, Cilt: 1 - Sayı: 5, 145–149. https://ajindex.com/articles/36580

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Kaynakça (4)

  1. Congleton, R.R.(1988). Evaluating Rent-seeking Losses: Do the Welfare Gains of Lobbyists Count? Public Choice 56:181 -184. [2] -Fromby, J.P., Keeler, J.P. and Thistle, P.D.(1988).
  2. X-effıciency, Rent Seeking and Social Costs. Public Choice 57: 115-126. [3] -Naughton, M. C, and Frantz, R (1991).
  3. X-effıciency, Rent-seeking and Social Costs: Comment. Public Choice 68: 258-265. [4] -McNutt, P.(1991) Re-evaluating Rent-seeking: Working Paper, Centre in Economics and Law, University College Galway, Ireland. [5] -Buchanan, M.J.(1980). Rent-Seeking and Profıt Seeking. In M.J. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds), Towards a Theory of The Rent-Seeking Society. College Station: Texas A&M University Press. [6] -Tirole, J.( 1988). The theory of Industrial Organization. Boston: MIT Press. [7] -Tyran, M.(\981).Handbook of Business and Financial Ratios. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hali. [8] -Eggertson, T.(1990) Economic Behaviour and Institution. Cambridge University Press. [9] -Comanor, W.S.and Leibestein, H.(1969).
  4. Allocate Effıciency, X-efficiency and measurement of Welfare Loss. Economica 36: 304-309. [10] -Crew, M.A. and Rovvley. C.K.(1971) On Allocative Effıciency and Measurement of Welfare Loss. Economica 38: 199-203. [11 ]-Boadway, R. and Bruce, N.( 1984). fVelfare Economics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. [12] -Tullock, G.( 1990). The Economics of Special Privileges, and Rent-seeking. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. [13] -Willing, R. (1976). Consumer's Surplus without Apology. American Economic Review 66: 589-597.