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Coordination with indirect messages in the stag-hunt game METU Studies in Development, 44 (August), 2017, 177-186

Coordination with indirect messages in the stag-hunt game

MÜRÜVVET İLKNUR BÜYÜKBOYACI HANAY
SERKAN KÜÇÜKŞENEL
Sayfa
177–186
DOI
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⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

On the other hand, players in the medium risk-averse group are willing to mimic the risk-loving group to achieve efficient coordination

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

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Amaç & Hipotez:We theoretically investigate the effect of allowing one-sided communication with costless indirect messages on stag-hunt game outcomes.
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Temel Bulgular & Veri:Since Heinemann et al. (2009) show that players who avoid risk also avoid strategic uncertainty, we chose a sender's level of risk aversion as the indirect message.
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Sonuç & Katkı:On the other hand, players in the medium risk-averse group are willing to mimic the risk-loving group to achieve efficient coordination
🔬Tür:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Kapsam:2009 Verileri
⚙️Değişkenler:Alan Parametreleri

Abstract

We theoretically investigate the effect of allowing one-sided communication with costless indirect messages on stag-hunt game outcomes. Since Heinemann et al. (2009) show that players who avoid risk also avoid strategic uncertainty, we chose a sender's level of risk aversion as the indirect message. We show that if both sender and receiver interpret the message content similarly, it is possible that they end up either on the risk-dominant or on the payoffdominant equilibrium. We also show that players in the extreme risk groups are willing to declare risk attitudes truthfully to increase the probability of coordination. On the other hand, players in the medium risk-averse group are willing to mimic the risk-loving group to achieve efficient coordination

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Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

HANAY, M. İ. B., KÜÇÜKŞENEL, S. (2017). Coordination with indirect messages in the stag-hunt game METU Studies in Development, 44 (August), 2017, 177-186. ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi, Cilt: 44 - Sayı: 2, 177–186. https://ajindex.com/articles/292097

Kaynakça (10)

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