Dergiler / Ağrı İbrahim Çeçen Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi / 2026 / Cilt: 12 Sayı: 1-2

ÇOK KUTUPLULUK VE KÜRESEL YÖNETİŞİMİN FARKLILAŞAN BİÇİMLERİ

MULTIPOLARITY AND DIVERGENT PATTERNS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Sayfa
157–185
Yayın Tarihi
2026-11-04
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⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

Bulgular, ABD’nin küresel sistemdeki merkezî konumunu sürdürdüğünü; buna karşılık Çin’in ve diğer yükselen ve bölgesel aktörlerin ekonomik, askerî, teknolojik, diplomatik, finansal ve normatif alanlarda eşitsiz biçimde nüfuz kazandığını göstermektedir.

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Amaç & Hipotez:Bu makale, çok kutupluluğa geçişin küresel yönetişimi maddi, kurumsal ve normatif alanlarda nasıl yeniden şekillendirdiğini incelemektedir.
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Temel Bulgular & Veri:Analiz, çok kutupluluğu üstünlüğün tek biçimli aktarımı olarak değil, yeteneklerin alanlara göre farklılaşan yeniden dağılımı olarak ele almaktadır.
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Sonuç & Katkı:Bulgular, ABD’nin küresel sistemdeki merkezî konumunu sürdürdüğünü; buna karşılık Çin’in ve diğer yükselen ve bölgesel aktörlerin ekonomik, askerî, teknolojik, diplomatik, finansal ve normatif alanlarda eşitsiz biçimde nüfuz kazandığını göstermektedir.
🔬Tür:Literatür & Derleme Çalışması
📍Kapsam:Genişletilmiş Akademik Örneklem
⚙️Değişkenler:ABD tek kutupluluğu · küresel yönetişim · çok kutupluluk

Özet

Bu makale, çok kutupluluğa geçişin küresel yönetişimi maddi, kurumsal ve normatif alanlarda nasıl yeniden şekillendirdiğini incelemektedir. Çalışma, gücün eşitsiz yayılımının neden bazı yerleşik kurumlarda reforma yol açarken başka alanlarda paralel kurumları, seçici iş birliğini ve daha güçlü normatif çekişmeyi teşvik ettiğini sormaktadır. Analiz, çok kutupluluğu üstünlüğün tek biçimli aktarımı olarak değil, yeteneklerin alanlara göre farklılaşan yeniden dağılımı olarak ele almaktadır. Araştırma, bu kavramı hegemonya, liberal uluslararası düzen ve küresel yönetişimden ayırmaktadır. Çalışma, çok kutupluluk ve küresel yönetişim üzerine gelişen literatürdeki temel argümanları ve soruları bir araya getirirken, gücün yayılımına ilişkin tartışmaları ekonomik, askerî, teknolojik, diplomatik, finansal ve normatif değişimlere dair güncel kanıtlar ışığında değerlendirmektedir. Kanıtlar altı güç alanı ve üç kurumsal tepki üzerinden düzenlenmekte, normatif çekişme ise bu tepkileri kesen bir boyut olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bulgular, ABD’nin küresel sistemdeki merkezî konumunu sürdürdüğünü; buna karşılık Çin’in ve diğer yükselen ve bölgesel aktörlerin ekonomik, askerî, teknolojik, diplomatik, finansal ve normatif alanlarda eşitsiz biçimde nüfuz kazandığını göstermektedir. Bu yeniden dağılım tek bir kurumsal yörünge yaratmamaktadır. Otoritesi kolayca ikame edilemeyen ve iç uyuma açık kurumlar reformdan geçerken, temsil açıklarının sürdüğü ve memnuniyetsiz aktörlerin alternatifleri destekleyecek kaynaklara sahip olduğu alanlarda paralel düzenlemeler gelişmektedir. Geniş uzlaşmanın maliyetli fakat dar kapsamlı eşgüdümün yararlı olduğu durumlarda ise seçici iş birliği öne çıkmaktadır. Liberal ilkeler küresel kurumlardaki yerleşik konumlarını korumakla birlikte, egemenlik, kalkınma, iç işlerine karışmama ve siyasal çeşitliliği vurgulayan taleplerle birlikte var olmaktadır. Makalenin özgün katkısı, çok kutupluluğu kurumsal gerilemenin veya hegemonik yer değiştirmenin doğrudan nedeni olarak ele almak yerine, bu eşzamanlı tepkilerin konu alanlarına göre neden farklılaştığını açıklayan koşullu bir çerçeve geliştirmesidir.

Abstract

This article examines how the transition toward multipolarity reshapes global governance across material, institutional, and normative domains. It asks why uneven power diffusion produces reform within some established institutions but encourages parallel institutions, selective cooperation, and stronger normative contestation in others. The analysis treats multipolarity as a domain-sensitive redistribution of capabilities rather than a uniform transfer of primacy and distinguishes it from hegemony, the liberal international order, and global governance. This article brings together the main arguments and questions in the growing scholarship on multipolarity and global governance. The study then places debates on power diffusion alongside recent evidence of economic, military, technological, diplomatic, financial, and normative change. The evidence is organized across six domains of power and three institutional responses. Normative contestation treated as a cross-cutting dimension. The findings show that the United States remains the central global power, while China and other rising and regional powers have gained influence unevenly across economic, military, technological, diplomatic, financial, and normative fields. This redistribution does not generate a single institutional path. Established institutions adapt where their authority is difficult to replace and internal adjustment remains possible. Parallel arrangements expand where representation deficits persist and dissatisfied actors possess the resources to sustain alternative pathways. Selective cooperation grows where broad consensus is costly but narrower coordination remains pragmatic. Liberal principles remain embedded in global institutions, while coexist with claims sovereignty, development, non-interference, and political diversity. The article’s contribution is a conditional-pathways framework that explains variation among these coexisting responses at the level of issue areas. It does not treat multipolarity as a direct cause of either institutional decline or hegemonic replacement.

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Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

Polat, T. (2026). ÇOK KUTUPLULUK VE KÜRESEL YÖNETİŞİMİN FARKLILAŞAN BİÇİMLERİ. Ağrı İbrahim Çeçen Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, Cilt: 12 Sayı: 1-2, 157–185. https://doi.org/10.31463/aicusbed.2001450

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