Dergiler / Sosyoekonomi / 2026 / Cilt: 34 Sayı: 70

Kamu Mali Verileriyle Ekonomik Popülizmin Ölçülmesi: Çekya ve Türkiye’deki En Büyük Şehirler Üzerine Görgül Bir Çalışma

Indication of Economic Populism Through Public Finance Measures: An Empirical Study of the Largest Cities in Czechia and Türkiye

Cenay Babaoğlu(NİĞDE ÖMER HALİSDEMİR ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0002-2935-0579
Robert Baťa(Univerzita Pardubice)0000-0002-8865-2534
Jan Fuka(Univerzita Pardubice)0000-0003-2218-8318
Altuğ Murat Köktaş(Necmettin Erbakan University)0000-0002-0911-2143
Onur Kulaç(PAMUKKALE UNIVERSITY)0000-0002-5135-0356
Pavel Zdražil(Univerzita Pardubice)0000-0003-0815-404X
Oğuzhan Erdoğan(MEHMET AKİF ERSOY ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0003-3809-6688
Sayfa
393–418
Yayın Tarihi
2026-10-27
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⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

Bununla birlikte, Türkiye’de özellikle İstanbul’da ve İzmir’de olası popülist davranışlara işaret eden bulgular elde edilmiştir.

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

🎯
Amaç & Hipotez:Bu çalışma, Çekya ve Türkiye’nin en büyük şehirlerinde ekonomik popülizmi incelemek ve karşılaştırmak amacıyla özgün bir yöntem olan Karma Popülizm Göstergesi yaklaşımını kullanmıştır. 2011-2021 yılları arasında yerel yönetimlerin kamu maliyesi verileri temel alınarak, standart finansal göstergeler ile faiz oranları arasındaki ilişkiler üzerinden ekonomik popülizmin belirtileri izlenmiştir.
📊
Temel Bulgular & Veri:Bu şehirlerde faiz oranlarında ve borçlanma maliyetlerinde birlikte artış görülmektedir; bu durum, mali disiplinin görece zayıf olduğu bir maliye politikası yaklaşımına işaret etmektedir.
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Sonuç & Katkı:Bununla birlikte, Türkiye’de özellikle İstanbul’da ve İzmir’de olası popülist davranışlara işaret eden bulgular elde edilmiştir.
🔬Tür:Literatür & Derleme Çalışması
📍Kapsam:2011-2021 Verileri
⚙️Değişkenler:Popülizm · Ekonomik Popülizm · Finansal Göstergeler

Özet

Bu çalışma, Çekya ve Türkiye’nin en büyük şehirlerinde ekonomik popülizmi incelemek ve karşılaştırmak amacıyla özgün bir yöntem olan Karma Popülizm Göstergesi yaklaşımını kullanmıştır. 2011-2021 yılları arasında yerel yönetimlerin kamu maliyesi verileri temel alınarak, standart finansal göstergeler ile faiz oranları arasındaki ilişkiler üzerinden ekonomik popülizmin belirtileri izlenmiştir. Eş bütünleşme ve korelasyon analizlerinin sonuçlarına göre, Çekya’da belirgin popülizm belirtilerine rastlanmamıştır. Bununla birlikte, Türkiye’de özellikle İstanbul’da ve İzmir’de olası popülist davranışlara işaret eden bulgular elde edilmiştir. Bu şehirlerde faiz oranlarında ve borçlanma maliyetlerinde birlikte artış görülmektedir; bu durum, mali disiplinin görece zayıf olduğu bir maliye politikası yaklaşımına işaret etmektedir. Bu tür bir davranış, kısa vadeli kazançların uzun vadeli mali sürdürülebilirliğin önüne konulması bağlamında ekonomik popülizm literatüründeki tanımlarla örtüşmektedir. Çekya’da ise Prag ve Pilsen şehirleri hakkında bazı popülizm emareleri bulunmakla birlikte, bu belirtiler finansal verilerde daha az belirgin biçimde ortaya çıkmaktadır. Ayrıca, Çek şehirleri genel olarak daha temkinli bir mali yaklaşım sergilemekte ve borçlanma maliyetlerinde belirgin artışlardan kaçınmaktadır, bu durum popülizm belirtilerini tespit etmeyi daha da zorlaştırmaktadır.

Abstract

This study applies the novel Mixed Populism Indication approach to examine and compare economic populism in the largest cities of Czechia and Türkiye. Using standard financial measures and their relationship with interest rates, we tracked potential symptoms of economic populism within local government public finance from 2011 to 2021. The pooled panel expansion of our analytical framework verifies the relevance of our method. It also assesses whether broader political or macroeconomic factors could explain the observed relationships. Based on the cointegration and correlation analysis results, we found no pronounced symptoms of populism in either Czechia or Türkiye. However, our results suggest possible populist behaviour in two Turkish cities, in particular Istanbul and Izmir. In these cities, increases in interest rates are associated with higher debt and debt costs, indicating a less restrained fiscal policy approach. This behaviour aligns with definitions of economic populism in the literature, as it prioritises short-term gains over long-term fiscal sustainability. In Czechia, suspicions of populism concern the cities of Prague and Pilsen, though the symptoms are less evident in financial data. Moreover, Czech cities generally take a more cautious fiscal approach, avoiding significant increases in debt costs, which makes signs of populism less discernible.

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Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

Babaoğlu, C., Baťa, R., Fuka, J., Köktaş, A. M., Kulaç, O., Zdražil, P., Erdoğan, O. (2026). Kamu Mali Verileriyle Ekonomik Popülizmin Ölçülmesi: Çekya ve Türkiye’deki En Büyük Şehirler Üzerine Görgül Bir Çalışma. Sosyoekonomi, Cilt: 34 Sayı: 70, 393–418. https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2026.04.17

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