We find that perfectly unequal skill distribution in which one group has a very high skill level and the rest are completely unskilled is socially optimal.
📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale
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Amaç & Hipotez:This paper analyzes optimal distribution of skills in an economy where, in addition to choosing income taxes, a redistributive government also chooses the dispersion of skill distribution given the average skill level of the economy.
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Temel Bulgular & Veri:This paper analyzes optimal distribution of skills in an economy where, in addition to choosing income taxes, a redistributive government also chooses the dispersion of skill distribution given the average skill level of the economy.
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Sonuç & Katkı:We find that perfectly unequal skill distribution in which one group has a very high skill level and the rest are completely unskilled is socially optimal.
🔬Tür:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Kapsam:Genişletilmiş Akademik Örneklem
⚙️Değişkenler:Alan Parametreleri
Özet
This paper analyzes optimal distribution of skills in an economy where, in addition to choosing income taxes, a redistributive government also chooses the dispersion of skill distribution given the average skill level of the economy. We find that perfectly unequal skill distribution in which one group has a very high skill level and the rest are completely unskilled is socially optimal.
Abstract
Bu makale yeniden dağıtımı amaçlayan ve doğrusal bir vasıf kısıtına maruz kalan bir sosyal planlamacının optimal vasıf dağıtımını nasıl yapması gerektiğini incelemektedir. Sonçlarımız bütün vasıfların bir grupta toplandığı tümden eşitsiz vasıf dağılımın optimal olduğunu göstermektedir.
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Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap
YAZICI, H., LEUNGA, T. C. (2017). On Optimal Skill Distribution in a Mirrleesian Economy. Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Cilt: 31 - Sayı: 2, 73–82. https://ajindex.com/articles/142120
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