KaydedilenlerDerginizi ekleyin

Dergiler / Adam Akademi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi / 2024 / Cilt: 14 Sayı: 2

İran’ın Güvenlik Stratejisi: Savunmacı Caydırıcılar ve Saldırgan Vekâlet Savaşının Dengelenmesi

Iran’s Security Strategy: Balancing Defensive Deterrents and Offensive Proxy Warfare

Melih Kazdal(MARDİN ARTUKLU ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0002-4729-4064
Sayfa
303–319
Yayın Tarihi
2024-12-31
🏛️Bu makalenin bibliyografik verileri ve tam metin bağlantısı DergiPark üzerinden sağlanmıştır.
DergiPark Kaydı ↗
✨

Yapay Zeka Hızlı Bakış & Çıkarımlar

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

Sonuç olarak, vekâlet savaşı bu üçlü stratejinin diğer iki unsurunu da güçlendirmektedir.

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

🎯
Amaç & Hipotez:Bu çalışmanın amacı, İran’ın güvenlik stratejisine vekalet savaşının nasıl entegre edildiğini tespit etmektir.
📊
Temel Bulgular & Veri:Çalışmanın temel argümanı, İran’ın güvenlik stratejisinin üç temel sacayağına sahip olduğudur: Balistik füze cephaneliği, nükleer program ve vekâlet savaşı kullanımı.
💡
Sonuç & Katkı:Sonuç olarak, vekâlet savaşı bu üçlü stratejinin diğer iki unsurunu da güçlendirmektedir.
🔬Tür:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Kapsam:Genişletilmiş Akademik Örneklem
⚙️Değişkenler:Güvenlik stratejisi · Vekâlet savaşı · İran

Özet

Bu çalışmanın amacı, İran’ın güvenlik stratejisine vekalet savaşının nasıl entegre edildiğini tespit etmektir. Çalışmanın temel argümanı, İran’ın güvenlik stratejisinin üç temel sacayağına sahip olduğudur: Balistik füze cephaneliği, nükleer program ve vekâlet savaşı kullanımı. İlk iki unsur doğası gereği daha çok savunmacı özellik taşırken, vekâlet savaşı saldırgan ve/ya ileri savunma bileşenlerini içermektedir. İran, vekil grupları aracılığıyla Ortadoğu’daki birçok çatışma noktasına aktif bir şekilde müdahale etmektedir. Vekil grupların konuşlandırılması, İran’ın mesafeyi koruyarak ve kendi hedeflerini takip ederek çatışmalar üzerinde nüfuz sahibi olmasını sağlamaktadır. Sonuç olarak, vekâlet savaşı bu üçlü stratejinin diğer iki unsurunu da güçlendirmektedir. Ayrıca tarihsel açıdan bakıldığında, İran’ın güvenlik stratejisindeki bu üç unsurun kökleri Şah Muhammed Rıza Pehlevi dönemine kadar uzanmaktadır. Bu durum İran’ın güvenlik politikalarında 1979 İslam Devrimi’nin neden olduğu değişim ve dönüşüme rağmen bir sürekliliğin olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Bu süreklilik, çalışmada bahsedilen güvenlik stratejisindeki üç sütunun etkinliğini arttıran uzun süreli politik kalıpların oluşmasına katkıda bulunmaktadır.

Abstract

The objective of this study is to ascertain how proxy warfare is integrated into Iran’s security strategy. The argument is based on an analysis of Iran’s security approach, which rests on three main pillars: its ballistic missile arsenal, nuclear program, and reliance on proxy warfare. While the first two is predominantly defensive in nature, the use of proxy warfare includes offensive or forward defense elements. Iran has actively engaged in various conflicts in the Middle East through the use of proxies. The deployment of proxy groups allows Iran to exert influence over conflicts while maintaining distance and pursuing its own objectives. Consequently, proxy warfare reinforces the other two pillars. Moreover, historically the three pillars of Iran’s security strategy can be traced back to the era of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. This reveals that there is a continuity in Iran’s security policies despite the alteration and transformation caused by the 1979 Islamic Revolution. This contiunity contributes to the formation of long term political patterns that increase the effectiveness of the the three pillars of the security strategy mentioned in the study.

🔖

Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

Kazdal, M. (2024). İran’ın Güvenlik Stratejisi: Savunmacı Caydırıcılar ve Saldırgan Vekâlet Savaşının Dengelenmesi. Adam Akademi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt: 14 Sayı: 2, 303–319. https://doi.org/10.31679/adamakademi.1573096

📄 Tam Metin PDF Okuyucu

📄

PDF görüntüleyici hazırlanıyor...

Kaynakça (43)

  1. Ajili, H., & Rouhi, M. (2019). Iran’s Military Strategy. Survival, 61(6), 139–152. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2019.1688575
  2. Akbarzadeh, S., Gourlay, W., & Ehteshami, A. (2023). Iranian proxies in the Syrian conflict: Tehran’s ‘forward-defence’ in action. Journal of Strategic Studies, 46(3), 683–706. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2021.2023014
  3. Alfoneh, A. (2018, January 30). Tehran’s Shia Foreign Legions. Carneigeendowment. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2018/01/tehrans-shia-foreign-legions?lang=en
  4. Azizi, H. (2022). Integration of Iran-backed armed groups into the Iraqi and Syrian armed forces: Implications for stability in Iraq and Syria. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 33(3), 499–527. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2021.2025284
  5. Azizi, H., & Vazirian, A. H. (2023). The Role of Armed Non-State Actors in Iran’s Syria Strategy: A Case Study of Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun Brigades. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 25(3), 540–557. https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2022.2143864
  6. Bahgat, G. (2019). Iran’s ballistic‐missile and space program: An assessment. Middle East Policy, 26(1), 31–48.
  7. Bahgat, G., & Ehteshami, A. (2021). Defending Iran: From Revolutionary Guards to Ballistic Missiles (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108608510
  8. Barzegar, K. (2010). Iran’s Foreign Policy Strategy after Saddam. The Washington Quarterly, 33(1), 173–189. https://doi.org/10.1080/01636600903430665
  9. Bicom. (2019, February 15). Hezbollah’s Precision Missile Project. https://www.bicom.org.uk/analysis/bicom-briefing-hezbollahs-precision-missile-project/
  10. Byman, D., Chalk, P., Hoffman, B., Rosenau, W., & Brannan, D. (2001). Trends in outside support for insurgent movements. Rand.
  11. Chubin, S. (2014). Is Iran a Military Threat? Survival, 56(2), 65–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2014.901733
  12. Clarke, C., & Smyth, P. (2017). The Implications of Iran’s Expanding Shia Foreign Fighter Network. CTC Sentinel, 10(10), 14–18.
  13. Cohen, R. A., & Shamci, G. P. (2022). The “Proxy Wars” Strategy in Iranian Regional Foreign Policy. The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 13(4), 385–405. https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2022.2061789
  14. Czulda, R. (2016). The Defensive Dimension of Iran’s Military Doctrine: How Would They Fight? Middle East Policy, 23(1), 92–109. https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12176
  15. Eisenstadt, M. (2011). The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Operational and Policy Implications (Mes Monographs No. 1). Marine Corps University.
  16. Eisenstadt, M. (2015). The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mes Monographs No. 7). Marine Corps University.
  17. Eisenstadt, M., Knights, M., & Ahmed, A. (2011). Iran’s Influence in Iraq: Countering Tehran’s Whole-of-Government Approach (Policy Focus No. 111). Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
  18. Elleman, M., & Fitzpatrick, M. (2017). Evaluating design intent in Iran’s ballistic-missile programme. Adelphi Series, 57(466–467), 89–130. https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2017.1555918
  19. Eslami, M., & Vieira, A. V. G. (2021). Iran’s strategic culture: The ‘revolutionary’ and ‘moderation’ narratives on the ballistic missile programme. Third World Quarterly, 42(2), 312–328. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1813562
  20. Filkins, D. (2013, February 17). After Syria. The Newyorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/02/25/after-syria
  21. Gaston, E., & Ollivant, D. (2020). U.S.-Iran Proxy Competition in Iraq (p. 66). New America. https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/us-iran-proxy-competition-iraq/
  22. Gleason, G. (2012). Implications of Iran’s Uranium Enrichment Programme for Regional Security. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 14(3), 317–330. https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2012.720773
  23. Hanna, M. W., & Kaye, D. D. (2015). The Limits of Iranian Power. Survival, 57(5), 173–198. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1090130
  24. International Crisis Group. (2018). Iran’s Priorities in a Turbulent Middle East (Middle East Report No. 184). International Crisis Group.
  25. Johnston, T., Lane, M., Casey, A., Williams, H., Rhoades, A., Sladden, J., Vest, N., Reimer, J., & Haberman, R. (2020). Could the Houthis Be the Next Hizballah? Iranian Proxy Development in Yemen and the Future of the Houthi Movement. RAND Corporation. https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2551
  26. Jones, S. G. (2019). War by Proxy: Iran’s Growing Footprint in the Middle East [CSIS Briefs]. Center for Strategic & International Studies.
  27. Juneau, T. (2016). Iran’s policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: A limited return on a modest investment. International Affairs, 92(3), 647–663. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12599
  28. Kazemzadeh, M. (2017). Foreign policy decision making in Iran and the nuclear program. Comparative Strategy, 36(3), 198–214. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2017.1338478
  29. Ostovar, A. (2018). Iran, its clients, and the future of the Middle East: The limits of religion. International Affairs, 94(6), 1237–1255. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy185
  30. Ostovar, A. (2019). The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients: Iran’s Way of War. Security Studies, 28(1), 159–188. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2018.1508862
  31. Reisinezhad, A. (2019). The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89947-3
  32. Saikal, A. (2019). Iran rising: The survival and future of the Islamic Republic. Princeton University Press.
  33. Samii, A. W. (1997). The Shah’s Lebanon policy: The role of SAVAK. Middle Eastern Studies, 33(1), 66–91. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263209708701142
  34. Seliktar, O., & Rezaei, F. (2020). Iran, Revolution, and Proxy Wars. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29418-2
  35. Tabatabai, A. M. (2020). No conquest, no defeat: Iran’s national security strategy. Oxford University Press.
  36. Tabatabai, A. M., Martini, J., & Wasser, B. (2021). The Iran Threat Network (ITN): Four Models of Iran’s Nonstate Client Partnerships (p. 27) [Research Report]. RAND Corporation. https://doi.org/10.7249/RR4231
  37. Taremi, K. (2005). Beyond the Axis of Evil: Ballistic Missiles in Iran’s Military Thinking. Security Dialogue, 36(1), 93–108.
  38. Taremi, K. (2014). Iranian Strategic Culture: The Impact of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Interpretation of Shiite Islam. Contemporary Security Policy, 35(1), 3–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.884341
  39. Tira, R., & Guzansky, Y. (2016). Is Iran in Strategic Equilibrium? Strategic Assessment, 18(4), 7–18.
  40. United Nations. (2015). Ballistic missile-related transfers and activities. Un.Org. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/ballistic-missile-related-transfers-and-activities
  41. United Nations. (2018). The Panel of Experts on Yemen (No. S/2018/594). United Nations Security Council.
  42. Williams, I., & Shaikh, S. (2020). The Missile War in Yemen (p. 68) [CSIS Missile Defense Project]. Center for Strategic & International Studies.
  43. Zeevi, D. (2022, September 27). New Ballistic Missiles Displayed at the Houthi Military Parade. Defense Update. https://defense-update.com/20220927_new-ballistic-missiles-displayed-at-the-houthi-military-parade.html