CROSS QUESTIONING THE REASONS OF THE RELIGIOUS RADICALISM: WHY DIDN’T MILLI GÖRÜŞ (NATIONAL VISION) GET RADICALIZED?

DİNİ RADİKALİZMİN NEDENLERİNİ TERSİNDEN SORGULAMAK: MİLLİ GÖRÜŞ NEDEN RADİKALLEŞMEDİ?

Abstract

Islamism has come out since 19th century and formed in three branches in the world namely “Muslim Brother”s in Arabic Peninsula, “Cemaat-iIslami” in Indian subcontinent and Anatolian Islamism. Anatolian Islamism, which became visible firstly by Ottoman Islamists, became active at the backstage for a while after the proclamation of the republic. After NecmettinErbakan had become independent member of the parliament from Konya in 1969, he started to organize “MilliGörüş” and then it became official. Unlike many Islamic formations which are active in Turkey, the most important feature of “MilliGörüş” is that it hasn’t involved in violence, even during the times when social violence were very intense or during the time when Islamic agenda became activist with Iran revolution, and it came into power by staying at democratic system. MilliGörüş which didn’t change his attitude, even though four of his political parties (National Order Party, National Salvation Party, Welfare Party, Virtue Party) were closed, has an important role and has a feature of being a distinguished laboratory in all of the Islamic formations. Starting out from the theoretical framework of religious radicalism, the main argument of this study is that, if Islamic political perspective is led properly it won’t bring radicalism and “MilliGörüş” can be shown as a sample. With in this context, the reasons behind the radicalization of “MilliGörüş” will be studied in four main points. The reasons generating from the Turkey’s typical conditions are the factor of leadership and the approach of perception of Islam, organization and the lastly MilliGörüş’s ideological data. Within the content of the study starting out from these four main points, by putting forward the differences of MilliGörüş from the other Islamist/Islamic formation, it is aimed to reach objective outcomes to prevent religious radicalism Although there is no commonly accepted definition in the literature, to express the adoption of a more or less coherent system of thinking and an anticipation of the future imitation and the use of force and / or violence as a method for dealing with at least one area of opposition to at least one area of common accepted norms in social, political and economic spheres" . In other words, it can be defined as radicalism by opposing the existing one and trying to place a new order through the use of force and / or violence. To make a conceptual distinction, the state of being opposed to a mainstream social, political, and economic current must be defined by the concept of extremism instead of radicalism. It also emerges as the first step in the production of radicalism. When extremism is accompanied by political or social activism, a distinction is made between radicalism and activism. Radicalism is activism, which is the next or simultaneous step that produces violence or tends to produce violence. However, it is unlikely that every activism will necessarily turn into radicalism. Since radicalism is inherently system oriented, the use of violence or force produced by it is also system-oriented, so it does not lead to civilians, nor is it systematic or persistent. When radicalism begins to practice violence against civilians, it turns into terrorism. In this context, terrorism is the next phase in which radicalism produces systematic and persistent violence against both the state and the civilians. However, it should be noted again; Every radicalism can not be expected to evolve into terrorism. Religious radicalism can be defined as a form of radicalism that legitimizes a conviction system as criticism of system dynamics through political arguments and to legitimize use of violence and / or power as a method - whether preaching a belief system or not - through religious arguments, planning to make a faith-based change in the present system. In fact, the factors that could lead to religious radicalism have six main reasons: 1. Political environment: a) The dissatisfaction created by secular or pro-Western governments for Muslims and the upset of public policies and politics produced by these administrations failing to meet religious expectations: "The state does not allow religious life!" b) Lack of political representation and inability or lack of political mechanisms that will transmit demands to the political arena: "I am not represented!" c) Inability or legal barriers for creating non-governmental organizations: "I can not express myself!" d) The limitation or absence of freedom of religion, or the state pressures on the freedom of religion: "I can not pray!" 2. Individual status: a) The quest for identity: "I exist with my belief, for what I believe, as long as I believe!" b) Individual weakness as an : "I am strong with believers like me!" c) Prove yourself: "I am ready for my beliefs!" d) Socio-economic deprivation and inadequate education: "because of you!" 3. Religious political goals a) Religious transformation practice in political structure: "The state for my belief, absolutely!" b) Defeat the west: "Now, it’s our turn!" c) Realizing the goal of politicized beliefs such as Promised Land or Golden Age of Islam:"my belief is my future!" d) Religious literal interpretation: "Each writing is an order!" 4. Social reasons: a) Being differentiated or excluded: "I am here!" b) Unable to adapt to the majority: "I do not believe that!" c) Immigration and integration problems: "My belief is good, but it’s up to you!" 5. Philosophical Causes a) Reaction to modernity and its institutions: “sole truth is my belief!" b) Globalization: "we are bigger now!" In the radicalization that began with the combination of a few of these causes, the individual is accusing external factors as a source of problems, and is now making a strong judgment that the in-system means do not work to destroy them. When these factors disappear, the suggestion of establishing a believed / promised future brings individual,MilliGörüş, which embraces geographicall

Özet

İslamcılık,19.yy'den itibaren varlık göstermeye başlamış ve dünyada Arap Yarımadasında Müslüman Kardeşler, Hint alt kıtasında Cemaat-i İslami ve Anadolu İslamcılığı olmak üzere üç ana kol üzerinden biçimlenmiştir. İlk kez Osmanlı İslamcıları ile görünürlük kazanan Anadolu İslamcılığı, Cumhuriyetin ilanıyla bir dönem perde arkasında faaliyet gösterirken, 1969 yılında Necmettin Erbakan'ın Konya'dan bağımsız milletvekili olması ve Milli Görüş'üteşkilatlandırmaya başlamasıyla resmileşmiştir. Türkiye'de faaliyet gösteren pek çok İslamcı yapıdan farklı olarak Milli Görüş'ün en önemli özelliği, toplumsal şiddet olaylarının en yoğun olduğu zamanlara ya da İran devrimi ile birlikte aktivistleşen İslamcı gündeme rağmen, hiçbir dönem şiddete bulaşmaması ve demokratik sistem içinde kalarak iktidara gelebilmiş olmasıdır. Dört partisinin (Milli Nizam, Milli Selamet, Refah, Fazilet Partileri) kapatılmış olması karşısında da tavrını değiştirmeyen Milli Görüş, bütün İslamcı yapılar içerisinde önemli ve ayrıcalıklı bir laboratuvar olma özelliği taşımaktadır. Bu çalışmada dini radikalizmin kuramsal çerçevesinden yola çıkılarak ortaya konulan temel iddia; İslami siyasal perspektifin doğru yönlendirildiği takdirde, radikalizm üretmeyeceği ve örnek olarak da Milli Görüş'ün radikalleşmemesinin altında yatan nedenler dört ana başlıkta incelenecektir: Türkiye'nin özgün koşullarından kaynaklanan nedenler, liderlik faktörü ve İslam'ı algılama biçimi, teşkilatlanma ve son olarak Milli Görüş'ün ideolojik verileri. Çalışma kapsamında bu dört temel noktadan hareketle, Milli Görüş'ün diğer İslamcı/İslami yapılardan ayrıldığı noktalar ortaya konularak dini radikalizmin engellenmesine yönelik nesnel çıktıların sağlanması amaçlanmaktadır