The Paradox of Power Asymmetry: When and Why Do Weaker States Challenge US Hegemony?

Abstract

Little is known about how, among weaker states, incentives to challengethe status quo are related to the expected response of the US as the system’shegemon. In contrast to conventional wisdom that suggests militarizedpunishment can deter potential challengers, it is argued that weak but stronglymotivated challengers can interpret the hegemon’s military intervention againstadversaries as a window of opportunity to launch their own actions. Empiricalresults using Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) and binary time-series cross-section (BTSCS) models reveal that weaker states possess incentives tochallenge the international status quo when the hegemon is preoccupied withprior foreign policy commitments, most notably war. In other words, weakerstates dissatisfied with the status quo are more likely to challenge the hegemonwhen it is preoccupied with prior military commitments. They do so becausewar involvement distracts the hegemon, drains its capabilities and resolve, andopens up a window of opportunity for weaker states to issue challenges. Inaddition, weaker states that have an alliance portfolio dissimilar to that of thehegemon are more likely than others to initiate Militarized Interstate Disputes.Theoretically, this paper provides microfoundations to answer the question ofwhy weaker parties instigate asymmetric conflicts when it might seem irrationalto do so.