Journals / Kader / 2019 / Cilt: 17 - Sayı: 2

Belief Control and Intentionality

İnanç Kontrolü ve Yönelimsellik

Journal
Kader
Pages
586–607
Publication Date
2019-12-31
DOI
—
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⚙️Variables:İnanç · Bağdaşımcılık · İnanmaya Karar Verme

Abstract

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Özet

Bu yazıda, inancın iradî oluşunu [doxastik voluntarism] reddetmenin, karşı çıkanların yaptığı kadar kolay olmadığını savunacağım. William Alston’un, inancın iradî olamayacağı savunmasını eleştirel olarak ele alıp, ardından inancın niyet edilebilir [bir konu] olup olmadığı sorusu üzerinde duracağım.

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STEUP, M. (2019). Belief Control and Intentionality. Kader, Cilt: 17 - Sayı: 2, 586–607. https://ajindex.com/articles/86518

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References (11)

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