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Journals / Maliye Dergisi / 2010 / Sayı: 158

Main sanctions for violation of fiscal policy rules in developed countries

Gelişmiş ülkelerde maliye politikası kurallarının ihlaline ilişkin başlıca yaptırımlar

AHMET AYSU
Pages
464–481
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

So the sanctions should take into account in rule based policy designing without political stance.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Fiscal policy rules have been used widely as policy tool in developed and developing countries to combat fiscal problems.
📊
Key Findings & Data:Fiscal policy rules should be well defined and its sanctions in a condition of violation should be determined clearly.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:So the sanctions should take into account in rule based policy designing without political stance.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

Fiscal policy rules have been used widely as policy tool in developed and developing countries to combat fiscal problems. Fiscal policy rules should be well defined and its sanctions in a condition of violation should be determined clearly. It is important to achieve rule-based fiscal policy objectives successfully. In this study firstly examined the rule-based fiscal policy arrangements in developed countries and afterwards the sanctions analysed when the fiscal rules not realise. Consequently, many developed countries has determined many fiscal rules, but these rules are not adequately supported by sanctions. So the sanctions should take into account in rule based policy designing without political stance.

Özet

Maliye politikası kuralları, gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülkelerde mali problemleri gidermede bir politika aracı olarak yaygın bir şekilde kullanılmaktadır. Kurallı maliye politikası amaçlarını gerçekleştirmek için mali kuralların iyi bir şekilde tanımlanması ve bu kuralların ihlalinde uygulanacak yaptırımların net bir şekilde belirlenmesi gerekmektedir. Bu çalışmada, öncelikle gelişmiş ülkelerdeki kurallı maliye politikası düzenlemeleri, daha sonra da bunların ihlaline ilişkin yaptırımlar incelenmiştir. Sonuç olarak, birçok gelişmiş ülkede mali kuralların yer aldığı, fakat bu kuralların yeterli yaptırımlar ile desteklenmediği ortaya çıkmaktadır. Kurallı politika tasarımında politik tutumların etkisinde olmadan yaptırımların dikkate alınması gerekmektedir.

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Cite This Article

AYSU, A. (2010). Main sanctions for violation of fiscal policy rules in developed countries. Maliye Dergisi, Sayı: 158, 464–481. https://ajindex.com/articles/79103

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