Journals / Maliye Dergisi / 2010 / Sayı: 159

Public economics solutions on environmental externalities

Çevresel dışsallıklarda kamu ekonomisi çözümleri

Pages
183–202
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Though each vehicle has both superiority and deficiency at a different matter, our work emphasizes “double dividend” approach and “pricing and standarts” approach.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:Externalities are called that as a result of an economic agent’s (buyer or seller) economic activity (production and consumption), other economic agents are affected positively or negatively from that and it is non-payment a compensatory price for this effect.
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Key Findings & Data:The most common example of the negative externalities, which imply marginal social cost is bigger than marginal special cost, is environmental pollution.
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Conclusion & Impact:Though each vehicle has both superiority and deficiency at a different matter, our work emphasizes “double dividend” approach and “pricing and standarts” approach.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

Externalities are called that as a result of an economic agent’s (buyer or seller) economic activity (production and consumption), other economic agents are affected positively or negatively from that and it is non-payment a compensatory price for this effect. The most common example of the negative externalities, which imply marginal social cost is bigger than marginal special cost, is environmental pollution. There are on the one hand market-based vehicles such as taxes, subsidies, fees, marketable pollution rights; an the other hand command and conrol which is named direct control or standarts at internalization of this market failure as an expressed environmental externalities. Though each vehicle has both superiority and deficiency at a different matter, our work emphasizes “double dividend” approach and “pricing and standarts” approach.

Özet

Bir ekonomik birimin (alıcı veya satıcı) gerçekleştirdiği ekonomik faaliyet (üretim veya tüketim) sonucunda, başka ekonomik birimlerin bundan olumlu veya olumsuz etkilenmesine ve bu etkiyi tazmin edici bir bedelin ödenmemesine dışsallıklar denir. Bir ekonomide marjinal sosyal maliyetin marjinal özel maliyetten büyük olmasını ifade eden negatif dışsallıkların en yaygın örneği çevre kirliliğidir. Çevresel dışsallıklar olarak ifade edilen bu piyasa başarısızlığının içselleştirilmesinde bir yandan vergiler, sübvansiyonlar, harçlar, pazarlanabilir kirlilik hakları gibi piyasa temelli araçlar, diğer yandan da doğrudan kontrol veya standartlar olarak isimlendirilen kumanda ve kontrol araçları söz konusudur. Her aracın farklı bir konuda üstünlüğü ve eksikliği olsa da, çalışmamız “çifte kazanç” yaklaşımını ve “fiyatlama ve standartlar” yaklaşımını vurgulamaktadır.

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Cite This Article

KARGI, V., YÜKSEL, C. (2010). Public economics solutions on environmental externalities. Maliye Dergisi, Sayı: 159, 183–202. https://ajindex.com/articles/79069

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