SavedAdd your journal

Journals / Maliye Dergisi / 2018 / Sayı: 174

The Budget Oversight Function of the Legislature as an Effective Accountability Mechanism

Etkin Bir Hesap Verebilirlik Mekanizması Olarak Yasama Organının Bütçe Gözetim İşlevi1

SÜLEYMAN DİKMEN
HÜSEYİN GÜÇLÜ ÇİÇEK
Pages
270–298
DOI
—
🏛️Bibliographic metadata and full text access for this article are provided via DergiPark.
DergiPark Record ↗
✨

AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

A functional accountability mechanism depends on effective oversight of budget and a healthy coordination among organisations.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:In representative democracies, citizens want to call ‘the elected’ to account whether they use the authority to take decisions and to apply them in the appropriate way or not.
📊
Key Findings & Data:Oversight function is realised through a comprehensive process including the determination of budget policies and programs, and the budget application results and performance.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:A functional accountability mechanism depends on effective oversight of budget and a healthy coordination among organisations.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

In representative democracies, citizens want to call ‘the elected’ to account whether they use the authority to take decisions and to apply them in the appropriate way or not. The budget embodies the delegation of authority between the citizens and deputies. The legislature observes whether decisions on budget are applied effectively, economically and efficiently with various instruments. In the study the oversight of the budget, which is the most crucial policy document of the government, by the legislature is assessed in terms of accountability. Oversight function is realised through a comprehensive process including the determination of budget policies and programs, and the budget application results and performance. A functional accountability mechanism depends on effective oversight of budget and a healthy coordination among organisations.

Özet

Temsili demokrasilerde vatandaşlar seçilmişlere devrettikleri karar alma ve uygulama yetkisinin amacına uygun şekilde kullanılıp kullanılmadığının hesabını sormak isterler. Bütçe ise vatandaşlar ile vekiller arasındaki yetki devrini somutlaştırmaktadır. Bütçe kararlarının etkin, ekonomik ve verimli şekilde uygulanıp uygulanmadığını yasama organı çeşitli araçlar ile gözetlemektedir. Çalışmada hükümetin en önemli politika dokümanı olan bütçenin yasama organı tarafından gözetlenmesi hesap verebilirlik açısından değerlendirilmiştir. Gözetleme işlevi bütçe politikalarının ve programlarının belirlenmesinden bütçe uygulama sonuçları ve performanslarına kadar geniş bir süreçte gerçekleştirilir. İşlevsel bir hesap verebilirlik mekanizması bütçenin etkin gözetimine ve kurumlar arasındaki sağlıklı koordinasyona bağlıdır.

🔖

Cite This Article

DİKMEN, S., ÇİÇEK, H. G. (2018). The Budget Oversight Function of the Legislature as an Effective Accountability Mechanism. Maliye Dergisi, Sayı: 174, 270–298. https://ajindex.com/articles/78863

📄 Full Text PDF Viewer

📄

PDF görüntüleyici hazırlanıyor...

References (12)

  1. Anderson, B. (2009), “The Changing Role of Parliament in the Budget Process”, OECD Journal on Budgeting, (1), 1-11.
  2. Atiyas, İ. ve Sayın, Ş. (1997),
  3. Siyasi Sorumluluk, Yönetsel Sorumluluk ve Bütçe Sistemi: Bir Yeniden Yapılanma Önerisine Doğru, İstanbul:
  4. TESEV Yayınları, No:4. Barraclough, K. ve Dorotinsky, B. (2008), “The Role of the Legislature in the Budget Drafting Process: A Comparative Review”, R. Stapenhurst, R. Pelizzo, D.M. Olson ve L. von Trapp (Ed.), Legislative Oversight and Budgeting içinde, Washington, DC: World Bank, 99-110.
  5. Bibby, J.F. (1966), “Committee Characteristics and Legislative Oversight of Administration”, Midwest Journal of Political Science, 10(1), 78-98.
  6. Biçer, M. ve Yılmaz, H.H. (2009), “Parlamentonun Kamu Politikası Oluşturma ve Planlama Sürecindeki Konumunun Yeni Kamu Mali Yönetim Sistemi Çerçevesinde Değerlendirilmesi”, Yasama Dergisi, 13, 45-84.
  7. Chohan, U.W. (2017), Ex-Ante or Ex-Post?Oversight and Parliamentary Budget Offices, Discussion Paper Series: The Art and Science of Legislative Budget Offices. Dye, K.M. ve Stapenhurst, R. (1998), Pillars of Integrity: The Importance of Supreme Audit Institutions in Curbing Corruption, WBI Working Papers, Report Number:19684. Washington, DC. Forrester, J. (2002), “The Principal-Agent Model and Budget Theory”, A. Khan ve W.B. Hildreth (Ed.), Budget Theory in the Public Sector içinde, Quorum Books, 123-138.
  8. Friedberg, C. ve Hazan, R.Y. (2012),
  9. Legislative Oversight, Comparative Assessments of Parliament (CAP) Note, Center for International Development, Rockefeller College University at Albany, State University of New York. Harris, J.P. (1959), “Legislative Control of Expenditure: The Public Accounts Committee of the British House of Commons”, Canadian Public Administration, 2(3), 113-184.
  10. Harris, J.P. (1964), Congressional Control of Administration. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. House of Commons (2017), Financial Scrutiny Uncovered A Guide for Members by the Committee Office Scrutiny Unit (3. Ed.). Johannes, J.R. (1979), “Casework as a Technique of US Congressional Oversight of the Executive”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 4(3), 325-351.
  11. Johnson, J.K. ve Stapenhurst, R. (2007), “The Growth of Parliamentary Budget Offices”, A. Shah (Ed.), Performance Accountability and Combating Corruption içinde, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 359-378.
  12. Johnston, N. (2007), Financial Oversight: a Handbook for Parliamentarians, Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption, World