Journals / Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi / 2013 / Cilt: 15 - Sayı: 3

The difference between experienced utility and decision utility in behavioral economics and an experiment

Davranışsal iktisatta deneyimlenen fayda ve karar faydası arasındaki fark ve bir deney

Pages
447–456
Publication Date
2013-04-01
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

In this experiment, it was concluded that their decisions based on remembered observations, in other words “experienced utility”, differs from “decision utility”; the results of their past decisions.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:According to neoclassic economics view, by acting rationally an individual reaches to the maximum utility.
📊
Key Findings & Data:There are cardinal and ordinal utility theories concerning the measurability an immeasurability of the utility.
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Conclusion & Impact:In this experiment, it was concluded that their decisions based on remembered observations, in other words “experienced utility”, differs from “decision utility”; the results of their past decisions.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Davranışsal İktisat · Deneyimlenen Fayda · Karar Faydası

Abstract

According to neoclassic economics view, by acting rationally an individual reaches to the maximum utility. There are cardinal and ordinal utility theories concerning the measurability an immeasurability of the utility. In the studies related to the behavioral economics, the utility is handled as decision utility, experienced utility (remembered utility and real time utility) and experiments have been conducted to explain these concepts. With the experiments dealing with the utility theories how people measure their utility and how they decide on whether they are happy or not are researched. In this study, an experiment carried out on the measurability of experienced utility and decision utility with Banking and Insurance students. An experiment was carried by asking different questions to the students based on same case. In this experiment, it was concluded that their decisions based on remembered observations, in other words “experienced utility”, differs from “decision utility”; the results of their past decisions.

Özet

Neoklasik iktisadî görüşe göre birey, rasyonel davranarak maksimum faydaya ulaşır. Faydanın ölçülebilir olduğuna ve ölçülemeyeceğine dair ise kardinal ve ordinal fayda yaklaşımları bulunmaktadır. Davranışsal iktisat ile ilgili yapılan çalışmalarda ise fayda; karar faydası ve deneyimlenen fayda (anımsanan fayda ve gerçek zaman faydası) olarak ele alınmakta ve bu kavramları açıklayabilmek için çeşitli deneyler yapılmaktadır. Fayda teorilerine ait deneyler ile kişilerin faydayı nasıl ölçtükleri ve mutlu olup olmadıklarına nasıl karar verdikleri araştırılmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, Bankacılık ve Sigortacılık Programı öğrencileri ile karar faydası ve deneyimlenen faydanın ölçümü ile ilgili deney yapılmıştır. Öğrencilere, aynı olay ele alınarak ve bu olay için farklı sorular sorularak bir deney yapılmıştır. Bu deneyde öğrencilerin aldıkları kararlarda, geçmişe yönelik gözlemlerine dayanarak aldıkları kararlarla, bir başka deyişle deneyimlenen fayda ile geçmişte aldıkları kararların sonuçları yani “karar faydası” arasında farklılıklar olduğu görülmüştür.

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Cite This Article

KAMİLÇELEBİ, H. (2013). The difference between experienced utility and decision utility in behavioral economics and an experiment. Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, Cilt: 15 - Sayı: 3, 447–456. https://ajindex.com/articles/67756

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