Journals / Uluslararası İlişkiler / 2016 / Cilt: 13 - Sayı: 51

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Future of Iran's Nuclear Program

Kapsamlı Ortak Eylem Planı ve İran'ın Nükleer Programının Geleceği

Pages
81–97
Publication Date
2022-11-03
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

This article concludes that JCPOA falls short of eliminating the motives and conditions of Iran to develop nuclear weapons, since new threats have worsened the regional security environment for Iran.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Why do states start nuclear weapons programs and under which conditions do they terminate these programs?
📊
Key Findings & Data:Answering these questions are essential to asses the potential of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was signed by EU3+3 and Iran in July 2015, to achieve its objectives.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:This article concludes that JCPOA falls short of eliminating the motives and conditions of Iran to develop nuclear weapons, since new threats have worsened the regional security environment for Iran.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:2015 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

Why do states start nuclear weapons programs and under which conditions do they terminate these programs? Answering these questions are essential to asses the potential of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was signed by EU3+3 and Iran in July 2015, to achieve its objectives. Comparative case analyses indicate that the primary factors in termination of nuclear weapon programs include reduction in national security risks and regime change. However, sanctions and supply-side limitations only delay the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This article concludes that JCPOA falls short of eliminating the motives and conditions of Iran to develop nuclear weapons, since new threats have worsened the regional security environment for Iran.

Özet

Neden devletler nükleer silah programı başlatırlar ve hangi koşullarda bu programları sona erdirirler? Bu soruların yanıtlanması, AB3+3'ün Temmuz 2015'de İran ile imzaladığı Kapsamlı Ortak Eylem Planı'nın (KOEP) hedeflerine ulaşma potansiyelinin değerlendirilmesi açısından önem taşımaktadır. Karşılaştırmalı vaka analizleri nükleer silah programlarının sona erdirilmesindeki en belirleyici etkenler arasında ulusal güvenlik risklerinin azalmasının ve rejim değişikliğinin bulunduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Öte yandan, yaptırımlar ve arz taraflı kısıtlar nükleer silah geliştirmeyi sadece geciktirmektedir. Makalenin vardığı sonuç, yeni tehditler sebebiyle bölgesel güvenlik risklerinde artış yaşayan İran'ın nükleer silah geliştirme motivasyonunu ve koşullarını ortadan kaldırmada KOEP'in yetersiz olduğu şeklindedir.

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Cite This Article

BAYAR, M. (2022). The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Future of Iran's Nuclear Program. Uluslararası İlişkiler, Cilt: 13 - Sayı: 51, 81–97. https://ajindex.com/articles/644993

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