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Journals / Uluslararası İlişkiler / 2019 / Cilt: 16 - Sayı: 63

Global Disorder

Hanns W. MAULL
Pages
3–12
Publication Date
2022-11-06
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

I also argue that the civilian powers were confronted with changes in the international environment that made it exceedingly difficult for them to succeed in their ambition to ‘civilize’, or transform, world politics.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:There is a broad consensus that the old, ‘liberal’ international order has been eroding for quite some time.
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Key Findings & Data:This erosion manifests itself in the progressive overextension of important norms and values, as well as international institutions, and the rise of violence in conflict management within and between states.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:I also argue that the civilian powers were confronted with changes in the international environment that made it exceedingly difficult for them to succeed in their ambition to ‘civilize’, or transform, world politics.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Özet

There is a broad consensus that the old, ‘liberal’ international order has been eroding for quite some time. This erosion manifests itself in the progressive overextension of important norms and values, as well as international institutions, and the rise of violence in conflict management within and between states. The reasons for these developments lie in a structural mismatch between the dynamics of globalization, on the one hand, and the capacities of politics to respond to them, on the other. A key problem in this context is conceptions of national sovereignty, which are at odds with the realities of a globalizing world. I also argue that the civilian powers were confronted with changes in the international environment that made it exceedingly difficult for them to succeed in their ambition to ‘civilize’, or transform, world politics.

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Cite This Article

MAULL, H. W. (2022). Global Disorder. Uluslararası İlişkiler, Cilt: 16 - Sayı: 63, 3–12. https://ajindex.com/articles/644949

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References (2)

  1. 1 Data drawn from Turkish Statistical Institute, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr (Accessed 20 June 2017). 2 Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Turkey and Russia in a Shifting Global Order: Cooperation, Conflict and Asymmetric Interdependence in a Turbulent Region”, Third World Quarterly, Vol 37, No 1, 2016, pp. 71-95. 3 Şener Aktürk, “Türkiye ve Rusya İlişkilerinin Yükselişi ve Gerilemesi: 1992-2015”,
  2. Gencer Özcan, Evren Balta, and Burç Beşgül (eds.), Kuşku ile Komşuluk, İstanbul, İletişim, 2017, pp. 129-147. 4 There is a rich literature on the effects of the distribution of power on alliance structures. See, for example, Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse”, Survival, Vol. 39, No 1, 1997, pp. 156-179. The literature on Turkish-Russian relations only partially utilizes this rich literature. 5 See Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, “Turkish–Russian Relations a Decade Later: From Adversity to Managed Competition”, Perceptions, Vol. 6, No 1, 2001, pp. 79-99; also see Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, “Turkish‐Russian Relations: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No 1, 2000, pp. 59-82. 6 Fiona Hill and Ömer Taşpınar, “Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?”, Survival, Vol. 48, No 1, 2006, pp. 81-92. 7 James W. Warhola and William A. Mitchell, “The Warming of Turkish-Russian Relations: Motives and Implications”, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 14, No 1, 2006, p. 127. 8 Richard Sakwa, “Russia and Turkey: Rethinking Europe to Contest Outsider Status”, Russie. Nei. Visions, 2010, p. 51; and Richard Sakwa, “The Death of Europe? Continental Fates After Ukraine”, International Affairs, Vol. 91, No 3, 2015, pp. 553-579. 9 Ayşe Zarakol, After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010. 10 For such a perspective, see Evren Balta and Süheyla Demir, “History, Identity and Foreign Policy: Ottoman-Turkish Image in the Current History Textbooks of the Russian Federation”, BILIG, No 76, 2016, pp. 1-31. 11 For an excellent debate on Turkey’s and Russia’s role in the formation of European identity, see Viatceslav Morozov and Bahar Rumelili, “The External Constitution of European Identity: Russia and Turkey as Europe-Makers”, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 47, No 1, 2012, pp. 28-48. 12 Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse, “Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict”, International Organization, 2000, Vol. 54, No 4, pp. 775-808. 13 Katherine Barbieri et al., “Sleeping w