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Journals / Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi / 2018 / Cilt: 40 - Sayı: 1

PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH COSTLY SWITCHING FROM A STATUS QUO

Begüm GÜNEY
Pages
43–50
Publication Date
2018-06-27
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Moreover, intermediate contribution levels are no longer optimal if the switching costdepends only on the status quo contribution level but not on the contribution level the agent switches to.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:We apply Guney and Richter’s (2016) choice model of costly switching from a status quo to publicgoods games.
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Key Findings & Data:We find that non-zero contribution into the public good can be optimal under a status quocontribution level.
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Conclusion & Impact:Moreover, intermediate contribution levels are no longer optimal if the switching costdepends only on the status quo contribution level but not on the contribution level the agent switches to.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:2016 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Public Goods Game · Contribution · Switching Cost

Özet

We apply Guney and Richter’s (2016) choice model of costly switching from a status quo to publicgoods games. We find that non-zero contribution into the public good can be optimal under a status quocontribution level. Moreover, intermediate contribution levels are no longer optimal if the switching costdepends only on the status quo contribution level but not on the contribution level the agent switches to.

🔖

Cite This Article

GÜNEY, B. (2018). PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH COSTLY SWITCHING FROM A STATUS QUO. Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt: 40 - Sayı: 1, 43–50. https://ajindex.com/articles/6363

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