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Journals / Insight Turkey / 2021 / Cilt: 23 - Sayı: 04

Turkey’s Grand Strategy and the Great Powers

Şener AKTÜRK
Pages
95–118
Publication Date
2022-10-19
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The article provisionally concludes that the Turkish grand strategy seems to be most compatible, or least incompatible, with the British grand strategy, followed by the U.S. grand strategy, among the five permanent members of the UNSC, whereas Turkish and French and especially Russian grand strategies seem particularly incompatible.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:How compatible is Turkey’s grand strategy with the grand strategies of global great powers?
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Key Findings & Data:This article briefly summarizes principles of Turkish grand strategy, both from a descriptive and normative point of view, and then proceeds to outline and compare the grand strategies of five great powers that are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
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Conclusion & Impact:The article provisionally concludes that the Turkish grand strategy seems to be most compatible, or least incompatible, with the British grand strategy, followed by the U.S. grand strategy, among the five permanent members of the UNSC, whereas Turkish and French and especially Russian grand strategies seem particularly incompatible.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

How compatible is Turkey’s grand strategy with the grand strategies of global great powers? This article briefly summarizes principles of Turkish grand strategy, both from a descriptive and normative point of view, and then proceeds to outline and compare the grand strategies of five great powers that are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). While there are some observable conflicts between Turkey and the French, Russian, and American proxies in Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus, there are no outstanding militarized conflicts between Turkey and the British proxies. China is also positioned against Turkey in several international conflicts including Syria, and the intense persecution of Turkic Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang adds another dimension of latent Chinese-Turkish conflicts. The article provisionally concludes that the Turkish grand strategy seems to be most compatible, or least incompatible, with the British grand strategy, followed by the U.S. grand strategy, among the five permanent members of the UNSC, whereas Turkish and French and especially Russian grand strategies seem particularly incompatible.

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Cite This Article

AKTÜRK, Ş. (2022). Turkey’s Grand Strategy and the Great Powers. Insight Turkey, Cilt: 23 - Sayı: 04, 95–118. https://ajindex.com/articles/521719

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References (3)

  1. Special Issue on “Debating Turkey’s Grand Strategy,” Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2020), pp. 151-283. 2. “Power and Paradox: Understanding Grand Strategy in the 21st Century,” TRT World Forum, (October 2021), retrieved from https://www.trtworldforum.com/trt-world-forum-2021/. 3. “Five Faces of Russia’s Soft Power,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, (November 2019), retrieved from https://www.ponarseurasia.org/wp-content/uploads/attachments/Pepm623_Akturk_Nov2019_1-8. pdf, pp. 1-6. 4. Şener Aktürk, “Turkey’s Grand Strategy as the Third Power: A Realist Proposal,” Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2020), pp. 152-174. 5. Iran’s GDP was about three quarters of Turkey’s in early 2020 (Iran’s GDP was $1,640 billion compared to Turkey’s GDP of $ 2,186 billion in purchasing parity power, according to CIA Facebook, accessed on January 12, 2020), and its defense budget was likewise about three-quarters of Turkey’s defense budget (Iran’s defense budget was $13 billion 194 million compared to Turkey’s defense budget of $18 billion 967 million according to the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, (retrieved January 12, 2020), as cited in Aktürk, “Turkey’s Grand Strategy as the Third Power,” p. 157, Table 1. As of late 2021, Iran’s GDP shrank to $1,044 billion, whereas Turkey’s GDP reached $2,393 billion in purchasing parity power, making Turkish slightly larger than twice the size of the Iranian economy
  2. retrieved October 31, 2021, from https:// www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/iran/#economy and https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/turkey/#economy. In short, depending on which measure of power one adopts, Iran’s military and economic power ranges between one-half and three-quarters of Turkey’s actual and latent power. No other immediate neighbor of Turkey even approaches half of Turkey’s economic and military power. In terms of demographic power, that is, population, Iran is the only neighbor of Turkey whose population is comparable and in fact slightly larger than Turkey’s
  3. but Iraq’s population also approaches half of Turkey’s population. 6. Aktürk, “Turkey’s Grand Strategy as the Third Power,” p. 155. 7. Diego Lopes da Silva, Nan Tian, and Alexandra Marksteiner, “Trends in World Military Expenditure 2020,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (April 2021), retrieved from https://www.sipri. org/sites/default/files/2021-04/fs_2104_milex_0.pdf. 8. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. R