Journals / Felsefi Düşün - Akademik Felsefe Dergisi / 2021 / Cilt: 1 - Sayı: 16

HUME’S PROBLEMS OF CAUSATION, INDUCTION AND METAPHYSICS

HUME’UN NEDENSELLİK, TÜMEVARIM VEMETAFİZİK PROBLEMİ

Pages
135–166
Publication Date
2022-10-18
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

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⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Therefore,Hume's problems of causation and induction can be read as a critique oftraditional conception of metaphysics.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:In this article, I examine David Hume's criticisms regarding the rationaljustification of causal and inductive inferences, and argue that thesecriticisms point to a fundamental problem about the possibility oftraditional metaphysics.
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Key Findings & Data:With a detailed analysis of Hume's criticism of thecausal principle and the necessary causal relations implied by this principle, Idemonstrate how the problem of causation leads to the problem ofinduction, which is a problem about the justification of our inductiveinferences.
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Conclusion & Impact:Therefore,Hume's problems of causation and induction can be read as a critique oftraditional conception of metaphysics.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

In this article, I examine David Hume's criticisms regarding the rationaljustification of causal and inductive inferences, and argue that thesecriticisms point to a fundamental problem about the possibility oftraditional metaphysics. With a detailed analysis of Hume's criticism of thecausal principle and the necessary causal relations implied by this principle, Idemonstrate how the problem of causation leads to the problem ofinduction, which is a problem about the justification of our inductiveinferences. As will be seen, the common problem of causal and inductiveinferences, according to Hume, is that they assume the principle of causalityand the principle of the uniformity of nature, respectively. While theseprinciples are accepted as universally valid truths, as Hume shows, they cannot be rationally justified. By showing that these principles cannot berationally justified, Hume points to the existence of a larger problem,namely the problem of metaphysics. Hume's main concern, therefore, is thepossibility of rational grounding of certain principles and ideas that arethought to be at the basis of metaphysics. In other words, he is concernedwith the problem of metaphysics, which is a problem about the rationalfoundation and the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. Therefore,Hume's problems of causation and induction can be read as a critique oftraditional conception of metaphysics.

Özet

Bu makalede David Hume'un nedensellik ve tümevarımsal çıkarımlarınakılsal gerekçelendirilmesine karşı eleştirileri incelenecek ve bu eleştirilerin geleneksel metafiziğin olanaklılığına dair temel bir probleme işaret ettiğisavunulacaktır. Hume’un nedensellik ilkesine ve bu ilkenin ima ettiği zorunlu nedensel ilişkilerin varlığına dair eleştirel argümanları ayrıntılı bir şekilde analiz edilerek, nedensellik probleminin nasıl olup da bizi tümevarımsal çıkarımlarımızın gerekçelendirilmesiyle ilgili olan tümevarımproblemine götürdüğü gösterilecektir. Görüleceği gibi, Hume’a görenedensellik ve tümevarımsal çıkarımların ortak problemi her ikisinin de genel geçer doğrular olarak kabul edilen ancak akılsal olarak gerekçelendirilemeyen nedensellik ilkesi ile doğanın tekdüzeliği ilkelerini doğru varsaymasıdır. Bu ilkelerin akılsal olarak gerekçelendirilemeyeceğini göstererek, Hume aslında daha büyük çaplı bir problemin, yani metafizik probleminin varlığına dikkat çekmektedir. Hume’un asıl ilgilendiği soru metafiziğin temelinde yer aldığı düşünülen ilke ve idelerin akılsal temellendirilmesinin olanaklılığı sorusudur. Bu da bir nevi metafizik bilginin temellendirilmesi ve bu bilginin olanaklılığı ile ilgili olan metafizik problemidir. Dolayısıyla Hume’un nedensellik ve tümevarım problemlerini geleneksel anlamda metafizik anlayışına karşı bir eleştiri olarak okumak mümkündür.

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Cite This Article

VATANSEVER, S. (2022). HUME’S PROBLEMS OF CAUSATION, INDUCTION AND METAPHYSICS. Felsefi Düşün - Akademik Felsefe Dergisi, Cilt: 1 - Sayı: 16, 135–166. https://ajindex.com/articles/513153

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