Journals / EGE STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR DERGİSİ / 2012 / Cilt: 3 - Sayı: 2

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY IN TURKEY

Pages
21–38
Publication Date
2022-10-12
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Since 2008, with the beginning of the second stage, as a result of the alleged Ergenekon organization and coup plans, the military has been inclined, to a great extent, to use informal mechanisms not as a way of intervening in politics but rather to protect its own public prestige.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:In recent years, under Justice and Development Party rule, intervention by the Turkish military into politics via formal and informal mechanisms has decreased.
📊
Key Findings & Data:This article aims to explain why the Turkish military’s influence in politics through both formal and informal mechanisms has been decreasing under Justice and Development Party rule since the 2002 elections.
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Conclusion & Impact:Since 2008, with the beginning of the second stage, as a result of the alleged Ergenekon organization and coup plans, the military has been inclined, to a great extent, to use informal mechanisms not as a way of intervening in politics but rather to protect its own public prestige.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:2002 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Civil-Military Relations · Formal Mechanisms · Informal Mechanisms

Abstract

In recent years, under Justice and Development Party rule, intervention by the Turkish military into politics via formal and informal mechanisms has decreased. This article aims to explain why the Turkish military’s influence in politics through both formal and informal mechanisms has been decreasing under Justice and Development Party rule since the 2002 elections. We argue that the two main reasons for the military’s decreasing role in politics in this period are the impact of the reforms intended to democratize civilmilitary relations within the context of the Turkey’s harmonization packages to European Union acquis and the alleged Ergenekon organization and coup plans. In the first stage, the formal mechanisms of the military decreased substantially with the introduction of the harmonization packages in 2003 and 2004. However, the military continued to intervene in politics largely through informal mechanisms such as speeches, press statements and declarations given by the senior members of the military on domestic and foreign policy issues. Since 2008, with the beginning of the second stage, as a result of the alleged Ergenekon organization and coup plans, the military has been inclined, to a great extent, to use informal mechanisms not as a way of intervening in politics but rather to protect its own public prestige.

Özet

In recent years, under Justice and Development Party rule, intervention by the Turkish military into politics via formal and informal mechanisms has decreased. This article aims to explain why the Turkish military’s influence in politics through both formal and informal mechanisms has been decreasing under Justice and Development Party rule since the 2002 elections. We argue that the two main reasons for the military’s decreasing role in politics in this period are the impact of the reforms intended to democratize civilmilitary relations within the context of the Turkey’s harmonization packages to European Union acquis and the alleged Ergenekon organization and coup plans. In the first stage, the formal mechanisms of the military decreased substantially with the introduction of the harmonization packages in 2003 and 2004. However, the military continued to intervene in politics largely through informal mechanisms such as speeches, press statements and declarations given by the senior members of the military on domestic and foreign policy issues. Since 2008, with the beginning of the second stage, as a result of the alleged Ergenekon organization and coup plans, the military has been inclined, to a great extent, to use informal mechanisms not as a way of intervening in politics but rather to protect its own public prestige.

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Cite This Article

YILDIZ, U. B. (2022). CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY IN TURKEY. EGE STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR DERGİSİ, Cilt: 3 - Sayı: 2, 21–38. https://ajindex.com/articles/495945

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