Journals / Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy / 2019 / Cilt: 9 - Sayı: 4

From Moral Intuitions to Free Will Intuitions: A Dual Interacting-Process Model

Ahlaki Sezgilerden Özgür İrade Sezgilerine: İkili Etkileşim Süreci Modeli

Pages
881–897
Publication Date
2022-10-11
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Finally, we critically examine other mechanisms and briefly defendour model.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:In this essay, after first briefly reviewing the literature on experimentalphilosophy and how and why it is important especially for contemporaryanalytic philosophy, we focus on two earliest experimental research paperson free will intuitions.
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Key Findings & Data:We also present psychological mechanisms that try toexplain why both philosophers and ordinary people have incompatibilist andcompatibilist intuitions and free will and moral responsibility.
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Conclusion & Impact:Finally, we critically examine other mechanisms and briefly defendour model.
🔬Design:Review & Systematic Survey
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

In this essay, after first briefly reviewing the literature on experimentalphilosophy and how and why it is important especially for contemporaryanalytic philosophy, we focus on two earliest experimental research paperson free will intuitions. We also present psychological mechanisms that try toexplain why both philosophers and ordinary people have incompatibilist andcompatibilist intuitions and free will and moral responsibility. We then moveon to another experimental research on moral intuitions and develop a dualprocess model based on the model to explain moral intuitions. However, ourdual interacting-process model is not intended for moral intuitions but free willintuitions. Finally, we critically examine other mechanisms and briefly defendour model.

Özet

Bu makalede, deneysel felsefe hakkındaki yazını ve deneysel felsefenin, özellikle çağdaş analitik felsefe için nasıl ve neden önemli olduğunu özetledikten sonra özgür irade sezgisi konulu ilk iki deneysel araştırma makalelerine odaklanıyoruz. Ayrıca neden hem felsefecilerin hem de felsefeci olmayanların özgür irade ve ahlaki sorumluluk konusundaki uyumsuzcu ve uyumcu sezgilerinin olduğunu açıklamaya çalışan kuramları sunuyoruz. Daha sonra ise ahlaki sezgiler hakkındaki bir başka deneysel araştırmaya geçiyoruz ve ahlaki sezgileri açıklamak için önerilen modeli esas alan bir ikili süreç modeli geliştiriyoruz. Ancak bizim geliştirdiğimiz ikili karşılıklı etkileşimli süreç modeli ahlaki sezgileri değil özgür irade sezgilerini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Son olarak da önerilen diğer mekanizmaları eleştirel bir şekilde değerlendirirken kendi modelimizi kısaca savunuyoruz.

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Cite This Article

SOL, A., ÖZER, Ö. D. (2022). From Moral Intuitions to Free Will Intuitions: A Dual Interacting-Process Model. Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy, Cilt: 9 - Sayı: 4, 881–897. https://ajindex.com/articles/463839

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