Journals / Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi / 2003 / Cilt: 58 - Sayı: 1

Validity of Reservations in the Optional Clause Declarations Concerning the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice

Uluslararası Adalet Divanı'nın Zorunlu Yargı Yetkisini Tanımada Çekinceler ve Geçerlilikleri

Pages
11–27
Publication Date
2022-10-11
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Some relevant principles of international law such as the principle of good faith and the regulation in Article 36 are depended on by the Court to judge the validity of the reservations in the Optional Clause declarations.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over international disputes is not compulsory.
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Key Findings & Data:One option is to become, by means of unilateral declaration, a party to the Optional Clause system devised by the Court's Statute in Article 36.
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Conclusion & Impact:Some relevant principles of international law such as the principle of good faith and the regulation in Article 36 are depended on by the Court to judge the validity of the reservations in the Optional Clause declarations.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over international disputes is not compulsory. States are free to decide whether the ICJ would handle a disputes to which they are a party. The compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ may be accepted through many different ways. One option is to become, by means of unilateral declaration, a party to the Optional Clause system devised by the Court's Statute in Article 36. Despite the obvious fact that the consent of States in the declarations under the Optional Clause is prevalent, they are not completely free to shape the extent of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ as certain type of reservations have failed to achieve the Court’s approval. Some relevant principles of international law such as the principle of good faith and the regulation in Article 36 are depended on by the Court to judge the validity of the reservations in the Optional Clause declarations.

Özet

Uluslararası Adalet Divanı'nın uluslararası sorunlar üzerindeki yargı yetkisi taraf devletlerin, Divan'ın bu yetkisini tanımış olmalarına bağlıdır. Divan'ın zorunlu yargı yetkisi değişik yöntemlerle tanınabilir. Bu yöntemlerden birisi Divan Statüsü'nün 36. maddesinde öngörülen tek taraflı bildirim yolu ile tanımadır. Özellikle bu yöntemle tanımalarda, Divan'ın yargı yetkisine kısıtlamalar getirmek için çok çeşitli türden çekinceler getirilmektedir. Fakat, özellikle Divan’ın kararları göstermektedir ki, zorunlu yargı yetkisini tanıma konusunda devletlerin iradelerinin üstünlüğü söz konusu ise de, yargı yetkisine getirilen çekincelerin şekillendirilmesinde devletler tamamen özgür değillerdir. Getirilen çekincelerin kabul edilebilir nitelikte olup olmadığı, bazı kurallar çerçevesinde bizzat Divan tarafından kararlaştırılmaktadır. Çekince getirme ve bu çekincelerin uygulanması konuları, iyi niyet, ahde vefa ve antlaşmaların konu ve maksadına uygunluk gibi Uluslararası Hukuk’un ve özellikle de antlaşmalar hukukunun temel prensipleri ışığında incelenmektedir. Divan Statüsü’nün 36. maddesindeki düzenlemeler ise, çekincelerin geçerliliğinin tespitinde diğer hukuki ölçütleri oluşturmaktadır.

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Cite This Article

ACER, Y. (2022). Validity of Reservations in the Optional Clause Declarations Concerning the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi, Cilt: 58 - Sayı: 1, 11–27. https://ajindex.com/articles/443326

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References (4)

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