Journals / Amme İdaresi Dergisi / 2021 / Cilt: 54 - Sayı: 3

The Failure of Nation-State Building Project in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s Winning Strategy

Afganistan’da Ulus-Devlet İnşa Projesinin Başarısızlığı ve Taliban’ın Kazanma Stratejisi

Pages
1–40
Publication Date
2022-10-11
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

In this context, it problematizes the solution approaches which were brought to bear against the chronic security issues that cause history to repeat itself in Afghanis-tan.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:Following the September 11 attacks, Afghanistan, which became central to the U.S.’s ‘global war on terrorism’ doctrine, neither achieved the survival of its ‘fra-gile/weak state’ status nor was able to mitigate the security threats and risks that stemmed from Taliban fundamentalism, despite a wide range of missions and activities undertaken by the United Nations and NATO.
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Key Findings & Data:This situation may be considered as the failure of the nation-state building project implemented by the U.S and the defeat of the international coalition forces after their 20 year long existence, as well as may be seen as the triumph of Taliban and its’ supporters.
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Conclusion & Impact:In this context, it problematizes the solution approaches which were brought to bear against the chronic security issues that cause history to repeat itself in Afghanis-tan.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

Following the September 11 attacks, Afghanistan, which became central to the U.S.’s ‘global war on terrorism’ doctrine, neither achieved the survival of its ‘fra-gile/weak state’ status nor was able to mitigate the security threats and risks that stemmed from Taliban fundamentalism, despite a wide range of missions and activities undertaken by the United Nations and NATO. This situation may be considered as the failure of the nation-state building project implemented by the U.S and the defeat of the international coalition forces after their 20 year long existence, as well as may be seen as the triumph of Taliban and its’ supporters. This article aims to shed light on ‘how the peace was lost’ in Afghanistan by focusing the internal and external dynamics behind Afghanistan’s long-term war fatigue. To reach this aim, this article takes into consideration domestic and foreign actors’ interests, objectives, and actions in the light of time and conjectural de-velopments. In this context, it problematizes the solution approaches which were brought to bear against the chronic security issues that cause history to repeat itself in Afghanis-tan.

Özet

11 Eylül saldırılarının ardından ABD’nin ‘terörle küresel savaş’ doktrininin merkez ülkesi olan Afganistan, Birleşmiş Milletler ve NATO nezdinde icra edilen tüm misyon ve faaliyetlere karşın ‘kırılgan/zayıf devlet’ statüsünden kurtulamadığı gibi, köktendinci Ta-liban’ın neden olduğu güvenlik sorunlarını da çözüme kavuşturamamıştır. Bu durum, 20 yıl boyunca ülkede varlık gösteren ABD’nin hayata geçirdiği ulus devlet inşası projesinin başarısızlığı ve uluslararası koalisyon güçlerinin yenilgisi olarak okunabileceği gibi, aynı zamanda Taliban ve destekçilerinin zaferi olarak da değerlendirmek mümkündür. Bu çalışma Afganistan’ın, uzun soluklu savaş yorgunluğunun arkasında yatan iç ve dış dinamikleri incelemek suretiyle, bir ülkede ‘barışın nasıl kaybedildiğini’ analiz etmekte-dir. Bahse konu amaç doğrultusunda makale, zaman ve konjonktürel gelişmeler ışığında yerli ve yabancı aktörlerin çıkar, amaç ve eylemlerini referans almakta; bu minvalde Af-ganistan’da tarihin yeniden tekerrür etmesine yol açan kronikleşmiş güvenlik sorunlarına getirilen çözüm yaklaşımlarını sorgulamaktadır.

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Cite This Article

SEREN, M. (2022). The Failure of Nation-State Building Project in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s Winning Strategy. Amme İdaresi Dergisi, Cilt: 54 - Sayı: 3, 1–40. https://ajindex.com/articles/435454

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