Journals / Akdeniz İnsani Bilimler Dergisi / 2014 / Cilt: 4 - Sayı: 1

On Michael Devitt s Empiricism

Michael Devitt'in Deneyciliği Üzerine

Pages
243–260
Publication Date
2022-10-12
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

And if it is right obscurity arguments may not have a decisive role in the apriorism/empiricism debate.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:Michael Devitt, in his several articles, defended the empiricist view that there is no a p riorijustification or that this concept bears no philosophical significance by attempting to demonstrate that it isa desperately obscure term and there is no need to this concept (even in epistemology, logic andmathematics) if the nature of epistemic justification is viewed in naturalistic and holistic ways.
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Key Findings & Data:In thisstudy it is argued that Devitt s argument fails due to the fact that a same kind of desperate obscurityargument may be raised also against the concept of empirical justification and its role in epistemological,logical and mathematical inquiry.
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Conclusion & Impact:And if it is right obscurity arguments may not have a decisive role in the apriorism/empiricism debate.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

Michael Devitt, in his several articles, defended the empiricist view that there is no a p riorijustification or that this concept bears no philosophical significance by attempting to demonstrate that it isa desperately obscure term and there is no need to this concept (even in epistemology, logic andmathematics) if the nature of epistemic justification is viewed in naturalistic and holistic ways. In thisstudy it is argued that Devitt s argument fails due to the fact that a same kind of desperate obscurityargument may be raised also against the concept of empirical justification and its role in epistemological,logical and mathematical inquiry. And if it is right obscurity arguments may not have a decisive role in the apriorism/empiricism debate.

Özet

Michael Devitt çeşitli makalelerinde A priori gerekçelendirmenin var olmadığı veya bu kavramınfelsefi bir öneme sahip olmadığı şeklindeki deneyci görüşü, bu terimin açık kılınamayacak kadar muğlakolduğunu ve epistemik gereklendirmeye doğacı ve bütüncül gözle bakılırsa böyle bir kavrama (epistemo- loji, mantık ve matematikte dahi) gerek olmadığını göstermeye çalışarak savunmuştur. Bu çalışmadaDevittin argümanının hatalı olduğu görüşü, Devittin açık kılınamayacak kadar muğlaklık eleştirisinebenzer bir eleştirinin empirik gerekçelendirme kavramı ve bu kavramın epistemolojik, mantıksal vematematiksel soruşturmadaki rolü hakkında da ileri sürülebileceği temelinde savunulmuştur. Ayrıca eğerbu görüş haklıysa, muğlaklık eleştirisinin a p riorizm/deneycilik tartışmasında belirleyici bir rolü olduğuda söylenemez.

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Cite This Article

ÖZTÜR, A. B. (2022). On Michael Devitt s Empiricism. Akdeniz İnsani Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt: 4 - Sayı: 1, 243–260. https://ajindex.com/articles/434079

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