Journals / Akdeniz İnsani Bilimler Dergisi / 2021 / Cilt: 11 - Sayı: 0

Republican Conception of Freedom

Cumhuriyetçi Özgürlük Anlayışı

Pages
83–99
Publication Date
2022-10-12
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Pettit claims that non-domination is superior from noninterference as an ideal because it aims to increase the choices of action qualitatively and it can justify the interferences on an non-arbitrary basis.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:In this paper, I try to examine the contributions of Philip Pettit to contemporary republicanism in the context of political liberty.
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Key Findings & Data:In the first case interferences on an non-arbitrary basis decrease the choices of action only quantatively, while in the second, these choices are limited qualitatively.
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Conclusion & Impact:Pettit claims that non-domination is superior from noninterference as an ideal because it aims to increase the choices of action qualitatively and it can justify the interferences on an non-arbitrary basis.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

In this paper, I try to examine the contributions of Philip Pettit to contemporary republicanism in the context of political liberty. While criticizing ‘freedom as non-interference’ and asserting his approach of liberty as ‘freedom as non-domination’, Pettit indicates that domination is always a power relationship based on social conditions. According to him, not all interferences threat individual liberty; but even the potential danger of an interference on an arbitrary basis diminishes human freedom. In the first case interferences on an non-arbitrary basis decrease the choices of action only quantatively, while in the second, these choices are limited qualitatively. Pettit claims that non-domination is superior from noninterference as an ideal because it aims to increase the choices of action qualitatively and it can justify the interferences on an non-arbitrary basis.

Özet

Bu makalede, Philip Pettit’in çağdaş cumhuriyetçiliğe katkılarını siyasal özgürlük bağlamında incelemeye çalışacağım. Tahakkümsüzlük olarak özgürlük şeklinde adlandırdığı kendi özgürlük yaklaşımını, müdahalesizlik olarak özgürlüğü eleştirerek ortaya koyan Pettit, tahakkümün her zaman toplumsal dayanakları olan bir güç ilişkisi olduğunu belirtir. Ona göre her türlü müdahale bireylerin özgürlüğünü tehdit etmez; ama tahakküme yol açan keyfi müdahalelerin sadece gerçekleşme riskinin var olması bile insanların özgürlüklerini azaltır. İlkinde keyfi olmayan müdahaleler kişilerin eylem seçeneklerini yalnızca niceliksel olarak azaltırken, ikincisinde onların eylem olanakları niteliksel olarak sınırlanır. Pettit’e göre, bir ideal olarak tahakkümsüzlük, kişilerin eylem olanaklarını niteliksel olarak arttırma amacında olduğu ve keyfi temelde olmayan müdahaleleri meşrulaştırabildiği için müdahalesizlik olarak özgürlükten üstündür

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Cite This Article

KARABABA, E. (2022). Republican Conception of Freedom. Akdeniz İnsani Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt: 11 - Sayı: 0, 83–99. https://ajindex.com/articles/433655

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References (2)

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