Journals / Akdeniz İİBF Dergisi / 2010 / Cilt: 10 - Sayı: 20

Alkol piyasasındaki bir bağımsız düzenleyici kurumun bağımsızlık düzeyi alkol pazarlamasını nasıl etkiler? Türkiye örneği

How can independency level of an independent regulatory agency in alcohol market affect alcohol marketing? The Turkish case

Pages
141–166
Publication Date
2022-10-11
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

As a result of analysis, it has been established that the TAMRA is one of the regulatory agencies with the lowest level of independency in Turkey and it has also been argued how this state of affairs is likely to shape up especially the marketing activities of the companies in the alcohol market.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The alcohol market is one of the leading sensitive markets in terms of economic and social life of a society.
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Key Findings & Data:This sector is regulated by independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in many countries.
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Conclusion & Impact:As a result of analysis, it has been established that the TAMRA is one of the regulatory agencies with the lowest level of independency in Turkey and it has also been argued how this state of affairs is likely to shape up especially the marketing activities of the companies in the alcohol market.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

The alcohol market is one of the leading sensitive markets in terms of economic and social life of a society. This sector is regulated by independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in many countries. However, it is not usually easy to find empirical studies on the impact of independency level of IRAs on the alcohol market. In this context, this study aims to analyze the impact of the formal independency level of the Tobacco and Alcohol Market Regulatory Agency (TAMRA) on the competitive structure of the alcohol market from macro point of view and on the marketing activities of the companies in the alcohol market from micro point of view. For the measurement of formal independency level comprising the basis of the analysis, multi-dimensional scaling has been used in this study. As a result of analysis, it has been established that the TAMRA is one of the regulatory agencies with the lowest level of independency in Turkey and it has also been argued how this state of affairs is likely to shape up especially the marketing activities of the companies in the alcohol market.

Özet

Alkol piyasası, ekonomik ve toplumsal yaşamda hassas olarak nitelendirilebilecek piyasaların başında gelmektedir. Bu sektör, birçok ülkede Bağımsız Düzenleyici Kuruluşlar (BDK) tarafından denetlenmektedir. Bununla birlikte, alkol piyasasında BDK'nın bağımsızlık düzeyinin etkisini inceleyen çalışmalar pek fazla değildir. Bu bağlamda çalışma, Tütün, Tütün Mamulleri ve Alkollü İçkiler Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumunun formal bağımsızlık düzeyinin makro açıdan alkol piyasasındaki rekabet yapısı, mikro açıdan ise alkol piyasasındaki işletmelerin pazarlama faaliyetleri üzerindeki etkilerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Analizin temelini oluşturan formal bağımsızlık düzeyinin ölçümü için çalışmada çok boyutlu ölçekleme yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Analiz sonucunda, Tütün, Tütün Mamulleri ve Alkollü İçkiler Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu Türkiye'deki en düşük bağımsızlık düzeyine sahip düzenleyici kurumlardan biri olarak bulunmuş ve bu durumun alkol piyasasını özellikle de bu piyasadaki işletmelerin pazarlama faaliyetlerini nasıl şekillendirebileceği çalışmada ele alınmıştır.

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Cite This Article

ÖZDEMİR, E., SOBACI, M., NARGELEÇEKENLER, M. (2022). Alkol piyasasındaki bir bağımsız düzenleyici kurumun bağımsızlık düzeyi alkol pazarlamasını nasıl etkiler? Türkiye örneği. Akdeniz İİBF Dergisi, Cilt: 10 - Sayı: 20, 141–166. https://ajindex.com/articles/433173

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