Journals / Advances in Hospitality and Tourism Research (AHTR) / 2016 / Cilt: 4 - Sayı: 2

APPLYING GAME THEORY AND TIME SERIES IN SMITH TRAVEL ACCOMMODATION REPORT (STAR)

OYUN KURAMI VE SMITH SEYAHET VE KONAKLAMA RAPORUNUN (STAR) UYGULANMASI

Pages
140–161
Publication Date
2022-10-11
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Findings indicate that two matrices have provided hoteliers with simple clues of different strategies in each month during the year to maximize their revenue.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Although Smith Travel Accommodations Report (STAR) benchmarks hotel performance against its competitive aggregate and local markets, hotel managers consider STAR as a reference document rather than a strategy model for hotel competition.
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Key Findings & Data:Limited research has focused on techniques to build a clue for STAR as a practice strategy.
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Conclusion & Impact:Findings indicate that two matrices have provided hoteliers with simple clues of different strategies in each month during the year to maximize their revenue.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

Although Smith Travel Accommodations Report (STAR) benchmarks hotel performance against its competitive aggregate and local markets, hotel managers consider STAR as a reference document rather than a strategy model for hotel competition. Recent research report managers prefer less information to use it as clues for a decision rather than more information not to be able to make a decision. It is imperative for hotel managers to use STAR as a clue for the competition. Limited research has focused on techniques to build a clue for STAR as a practice strategy. The present study has built two matrices by STAR indices. After that, game theory strategies were conducted to forecast the outcomes whenever hotel mangers change price. A sample of hotel guests who stayed in seven top hotel destinations in the U.S. during the ten-year period was selected in the scenario with two assumptions: (1) there are two players in the U.S. meeting business: Player 1 includes hoteliers in Washington DC, Virginia, and Maryland and player 2 includes hoteliers in Orlando, Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York and (2) customers in a hotel of player 1 prefer staying in the hotel of player 1 rather than staying in the hotel of player 2 and vice versa. Findings indicate that two matrices have provided hoteliers with simple clues of different strategies in each month during the year to maximize their revenue.

Özet

Smith seyahat ve ağırlama raporu (STAR) yerel pazar ve rekabet kümesine kıyasla otel performansını kıyaslasa da otel yöneticileri STAR'ı rekabet için stratejik bir modelden ziyade bir referans dokümanı olarak değerlendiriyorlar. Yakın zamanlı çalışmalar yöneticilerin çok bilgiyle karar verememektense, az bilginin karar vermesine yardımcı ipuçları sunmasını tercih ettiğini gösteriyor. Bu durum otel yöneticileri için rekabette STAR'ı kullanmalarını kaçınılmaz kılıyor. Pratik strateji geliştirmek amacıyla STAR'ı kullanılmasını sağlayacak tekniklere odaklanan kısıtlı sayıda çalışma bulunmaktadır. Mevcut çalışma STAR indekslerini kullanarak iki matris kurmuştur. Sonrasında otel yöneticisi fiyatı değiştirdiği takdirde elde edilecek çıktıları tahmin etme üzere oyun kuramı stratejilerine başvurulmuştur. 2005 ve 2015 yılları arasında on yıllık süreçte ABD'nin önde gelen yedi destinasyonunda konaklayan otel misafirlerinin örneklemi oluşturduğu çalışmada iki senaryo geliştirilmiştir; (1) Amerikan toplantı işinde iki oyuncu bulunmaktadır: Birinci oyuncu Washington, Virginia ve Maryland'de bulunan otelcileri, ikinci oyuncu ise Orlando, Los Angeles, Chicago ve New York'taki otelcilerden oluşmaktadır; (2) birinci oyuncunun bir müşterisi yine aynı oyuncuya ait bir otelde, ikinci oyuncunun müşterisi ise ikinci oyuncunun bir otelinde kalmayı tercih eder. İki matrisin bulguları yılın her ayı için farklı otel gelirlerini azami seviyeye yükseltecek birtakım kolay ipuçları sunmaktadır.

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Cite This Article

TRAN, D., TRAN, X., VO, N., DEWI, N. P. K., JENKINS, Z. (2022). APPLYING GAME THEORY AND TIME SERIES IN SMITH TRAVEL ACCOMMODATION REPORT (STAR). Advances in Hospitality and Tourism Research (AHTR), Cilt: 4 - Sayı: 2, 140–161. https://ajindex.com/articles/429486

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