Journals / FLSF Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi / 2026 / Sayı: 1

Rethink the Truth Beyond the Borders of Epistemology: Rorty and Heidegger

DOĞRULUĞU EPİSTEMOLOJİNİN SINIRLARI DIŞINDA YENİDEN DÜŞÜNMEK: RORTY VE HEIDEGGER

Özgür Aktok(Araştırma Görevlisi, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü)
Pages
95–102
Publication Date
2006-06-01
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

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⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Secondly, I show that the basic problem with Rorty’s self-refuting argument stems from his criticism of Platonism, which he bases on his own inconsistent definition of Platonism, and at the end, I offer Heidegger’s ontological conception of truth, which he bases on his more consistent definition and criticism of Platonism, as a more successful conception of truth.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:In this presentation, I examine and compare the two different conceptions of truth of two philosophers; the neo-pragmatist American philosopher Richard Rorty and the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, who have thought the concept of truth beyond the limits of epistemology.
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Key Findings & Data:Firstly, after I clarify Rorty’s conception of “pragmatic truth,” I show how Rorty’s conception undermines its own main motivation for freedom.
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Conclusion & Impact:Secondly, I show that the basic problem with Rorty’s self-refuting argument stems from his criticism of Platonism, which he bases on his own inconsistent definition of Platonism, and at the end, I offer Heidegger’s ontological conception of truth, which he bases on his more consistent definition and criticism of Platonism, as a more successful conception of truth.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Heidegger · Rorty · doğruluk

Abstract

In this presentation, I examine and compare the two different conceptions of truth of two philosophers; the neo-pragmatist American philosopher Richard Rorty and the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, who have thought the concept of truth beyond the limits of epistemology. Firstly, after I clarify Rorty’s conception of “pragmatic truth,” I show how Rorty’s conception undermines its own main motivation for freedom. Secondly, I show that the basic problem with Rorty’s self-refuting argument stems from his criticism of Platonism, which he bases on his own inconsistent definition of Platonism, and at the end, I offer Heidegger’s ontological conception of truth, which he bases on his more consistent definition and criticism of Platonism, as a more successful conception of truth.

Özet

Bu bildiride, doğruluk kavramını modern epistemolojinin sınırları dışında düşünmüş olan iki filozofun, Amerikalı neo-pragmatist Richard Rorty ve Alman Martin Heidegger’in doğruluk anlayışlarını karşılaştırarak ele alıyorum. Öncelikle Rorty’nin “pragmatik doğruluk” anlayışını açıklığa kavuşturduktan sonra, bu anlayışın, Rorty’nin ortaya attığı kendi özgürlük gerekçesinin altını nasıl oyduğunu gösteriyorum. Daha sonra, Rorty’nin kendi kendisini reddeden argümanındaki bu temel sorunun, onun tutarsız Platonculuk tanımına dayandırdığı Platonculuk eleştirisinden kaynaklandığını ortaya koyarak, Heidegger’in Rorty’e göre daha tutarlı olan Platonculuk tanımı ve eleştirisi üzerine inşa ettiği “ontolojik doğruluk” anlayışını, Rorty’nin doğruluk anlayışına göre daha başarılı bir doğruluk anlayışı olarak öneriyorum

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Cite This Article

Aktok, Ö. (2006). Rethink the Truth Beyond the Borders of Epistemology: Rorty and Heidegger. FLSF Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Sayı: 1, 95–102. https://ajindex.com/articles/396905

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References (6)

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  2. Heidegger, Martin. Gesammtausgabe Vol.65: Beitraege zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Klostermann. Frankfurt: 1989, 1936-8 el yazmaları.
  3. Heidegger, Martin. Nihilism. Nietzsche II. Çeviri: Frank A.Capuzzi. Harper and Row. New York: 1982.
  4. Rorty, Richard, Consequences of Pragmatism. University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis: 1982.
  5. Rorty, Richard, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press. Princeton, NJ: 1979
  6. Rorty, Richard,“Solidarity or Objectivity?” Post-analytic Philosophy, ed. John Rajchman ve Cornel West. Columbia University Press. New York: 1985.