Journals / BELLETEN / 2022 / Cilt: 86 - Sayı: 305

From Treason to Throne: Romanos Diogenes IV.

İhanetten İmparatorluğa: IV. Romanos Diogenes

Journal
BELLETEN
Pages
89–118
Publication Date
2022-04-12
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

In this study, in order to clarify the situation in question, first of all, the development course of the Byzantine army and the process of Romanos Diogenes IV’s becoming emperor was mentioned, and then the decisive role of the mentioned factors in the loss of the Battle of Manzikert was emphasized.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Eastern Rome, also known as the Byzantine Empire, has survived for centuries thanks to its powerful army that has managed to adapt to the requirements of the age.
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Key Findings & Data:During the reign of Romanos Diogenes IV (1068-1071), this self-confident army, which was prepared to eliminate the Great Seljuk State by mobilizing all its means, suffered an unexpectedly heavy defeat against Sultan Alp Arslan in Manzikert (26 August 1071).
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Conclusion & Impact:In this study, in order to clarify the situation in question, first of all, the development course of the Byzantine army and the process of Romanos Diogenes IV’s becoming emperor was mentioned, and then the decisive role of the mentioned factors in the loss of the Battle of Manzikert was emphasized.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:IV. Romanos Diogenes · Bizans · Malazgirt

Abstract

Eastern Rome, also known as the Byzantine Empire, has survived for centuries thanks to its powerful army that has managed to adapt to the requirements of the age. During the reign of Romanos Diogenes IV (1068-1071), this self-confident army, which was prepared to eliminate the Great Seljuk State by mobilizing all its means, suffered an unexpectedly heavy defeat against Sultan Alp Arslan in Manzikert (26 August 1071). While the discussions on this defeat, which is regarded as a breaking point in Byzantine military history, mostly focused on the success and gains of the Seljuk army, the strategic errors / mistakes that led to the defeat of the Byzantine army were not sufficiently emphasized. Within this approach, the main reason for the defeat was the Emperor rather than the strength of the Seljuk army. It has been ignored that Romanos had too much confidence in the numerical majority-moral superiority of the Byzantine army due to the psychological situation before the war and the traditional imperial thought. In this study, in order to clarify the situation in question, first of all, the development course of the Byzantine army and the process of Romanos Diogenes IV’s becoming emperor was mentioned, and then the decisive role of the mentioned factors in the loss of the Battle of Manzikert was emphasized.

Özet

Bizans İmparatorluğu olarak da bilinen Doğu Roma, çağın gereklerine uyum sağlamayı başaran güçlü ordusu sayesinde varlığını asırlarca devam ettirebilmiştir. İmparator IV. Romanos Diogenes döneminde (1068-1071) bütün imkânlar seferber edilerek Büyük Selçuklu Devleti’ni ortadan kaldırmaya yönelik hazırlanan özgüveni yüksek bu ordu, Malazgirt’te Sultan Alp Arslan karşısında beklenmedik ağır bir yenilgiye uğramıştır (26 Ağustos 1071). Bizans askerî tarihinde bir kırılma noktası olarak kabul edilen bu hezimet üzerine yapılan tartışmalar daha çok Büyük Selçuklu ordusunun başarısı ve kazanımları üzerine odaklanırken Bizans ordusunun yenilgisine yol açan stratejik hata/ hatalar üzerinde yeterince durulmamıştır. Bu yaklaşım çerçevesinde, yenilginin temel nedeninin Selçuklu ordusunun gücünden ziyade İmparator IV. Romanos’un savaş öncesindeki psikolojik durumunun ve geleneksel imparatorluk düşüncesinin etkisiyle Bizans ordusunun sayısal çoğunluğuna-moral üstünlüğüne fazlaca güven duymuş olduğu göz ardı edilmiştir. Bu çalışmada, söz konusu durumu aydınlığa kavuşturmak adına, öncelikle Bizans ordusunun gelişim seyri ile IV. Romanos Diogenes’in imparator olma sürecine değinilmiş ve ardından belirtilen faktörlerin Malazgirt Savaşı’nın kaybedilmesindeki belirleyici rolü üzerinde durulmuştur.

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Cite This Article

KEÇİŞ, M. (2022). From Treason to Throne: Romanos Diogenes IV.. BELLETEN, Cilt: 86 - Sayı: 305, 89–118. https://ajindex.com/articles/383850

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