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Journals / Ticaret ve Fikri Mülkiyet Hukuku Dergisi / 2015 / Cilt: 1 - Sayı: 2

REGULATION OF EXCESSIVE COMPENSATIONS IN LISTED STOCK COMPANIES COULD SWITZERLAND SERVE AS A ROLE MODEL?

iur Tizian TROXLER
Pages
161–181
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The present article examines the suitability of the Swiss regulatory approach and undertakes a critical evaluation with regard to comparative legal aspects.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:In Switzerland the in many cases very high compensations paid to the board of directors or to top executive managers in listed stock companies arouse criticism, incomprehension and outrage in broad parts of the public.
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Key Findings & Data:Excessive compensations generally are said to be harmful to the corporations themselves and furthermore a threat for the social peace.
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Conclusion & Impact:The present article examines the suitability of the Swiss regulatory approach and undertakes a critical evaluation with regard to comparative legal aspects.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

In Switzerland the in many cases very high compensations paid to the board of directors or to top executive managers in listed stock companies arouse criticism, incomprehension and outrage in broad parts of the public. Excessive compensations generally are said to be harmful to the corporations themselves and furthermore a threat for the social peace. This, however highly disputed, perception lead in Switzerland not only to the controversial public debates that even took place in other European countries but recently also to a drastic and unique statutory regulation of excessive compensations in listed stock companies. The present article examines the suitability of the Swiss regulatory approach and undertakes a critical evaluation with regard to comparative legal aspects.

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Cite This Article

TROXLER, I. T. (2015). REGULATION OF EXCESSIVE COMPENSATIONS IN LISTED STOCK COMPANIES COULD SWITZERLAND SERVE AS A ROLE MODEL?. Ticaret ve Fikri Mülkiyet Hukuku Dergisi, Cilt: 1 - Sayı: 2, 161–181. https://ajindex.com/articles/361409

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