Journals / Amme İdaresi Dergisi / 2005 / Cilt: 38 - Sayı: 3

The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement

Organize Suçun Ekonomik Analizi ve Optimal Hukuk Uygulaması

Pages
81–99
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

This theoretical framework has also some law enforcement implications against organized crime.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Organized crime is recognized as one of the most important phenomenon of the world.
📊
Key Findings & Data:The 21st century is expected to be characterized by organized crime.
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Conclusion & Impact:This theoretical framework has also some law enforcement implications against organized crime.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:ekonomik analizler · suç · pazarlama

Abstract

Organized crime is recognized as one of the most important phenomenon of the world. The 21st century is expected to be characterized by organized crime. It is counted among the basic parameters in the process of restructuring the world geopolitics, today. Its effect on the real and financial markets and social life is increasingly emphasized by the world's political and economic sections. But there is a very little body of theoretical studies on organized crime. And this inadequacy makes difficult to perceive organized crime accurately. The purpose of this study is to offer a theoretical framework to explain the structure and operation of organized crime in the crime market. This theoretical framework has also some law enforcement implications against organized crime.

Özet

Organize suç günümüzün en önemli olgularından biridir.19.yüzyılı sömürgeciliğin,20.yüzyılı soğuk savaşın karakterize etmesi gibi 21.yüzyılı da"organize suçun karakterize edeceği öngörülmektedir.organize suç dünya jeopolitiğinin yeniden yapılandırılmasa sürecinde temel parametrelerden biridir. Reel ve finansal piyasalar üzerindeki etkisi giderek daha çok gündeme gelmektedir.Ancak organize suçun açıklanmasına yönelik teorik birikim son derece yetersizdir.Oysa bir teorik çerçeve olmeksızın hiçbir algılama olanaklı değildir.Bu çalışima organize suçun yapısını ve işleyişini açıklamaya yönelik teorik bir çerçeve sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.Bu teorik çerçeve organize suça karşı izlenecek optimal hukuk uygulamaları açısındanda önemli sonuçlar içermektedir.

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Cite This Article

GÜVEL, E. A. (2005). The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement. Amme İdaresi Dergisi, Cilt: 38 - Sayı: 3, 81–99. https://ajindex.com/articles/356617

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