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Journals / Yönetim Araştırmaları Dergisi / 2006 / Cilt: 6 - Sayı: 1

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL COMPETITION

YÖNETİŞİM VE KÜRESEL REKABET

Melsa ARARAT
B. Burçin YURTOĞLU
Pages
5–44
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The paper ends with a tentative outlook as to the prospects of corporate governance structures converging worldwide.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This survey provides an overview of the current state of knowledge on the question of whether corporate governance structures worldwide are determinants of differences in economic performance between countries.
📊
Key Findings & Data:We look at the identities of owners, monitoring boards, and legal systems and argue that some though not all corporate governance structures give rise to differences in performance.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:The paper ends with a tentative outlook as to the prospects of corporate governance structures converging worldwide.
🔬Design:Survey & Empirical Study
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

This survey provides an overview of the current state of knowledge on the question of whether corporate governance structures worldwide are determinants of differences in economic performance between countries. We look at the identities of owners, monitoring boards, and legal systems and argue that some though not all corporate governance structures give rise to differences in performance. We also look at the impact of the degree of competition in product markets on governance structures. The paper ends with a tentative outlook as to the prospects of corporate governance structures converging worldwide.

Özet

Bu makale yönetişim sistemleri ve ülkelerin ekonomik performansı arasındaki ilişki konusunda yapılan araştırmaların bir sentezini oluşturmaya çalışmaktadır. Makalede yönetişim sistemlerinin çerçevesinin belirlenmesinde önemli rol oynadıkları düşünülen sahiplik yapıları, yönetim kurulları ve hukuk sistemleri incelenmekte ve bu yapılardan bazılarının makro- ve mikroekonomik performansa önemli etkileri olduğu vurgulanmaktadır. Bunu yaparken mal piyasalarındaki rekabet düzeyinin yönetişim yapılarına etkisi de ele alınmaktadır. Makalenin son kısmında yönetişim yapılarının yakınsaması hakkında muhtemel senaryolar değerlendirilmektedir.

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Cite This Article

ARARAT, M., YURTOĞLU, B. B. (2006). CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL COMPETITION. Yönetim Araştırmaları Dergisi, Cilt: 6 - Sayı: 1, 5–44. https://ajindex.com/articles/336540

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