Journals / Rekabet Dergisi / 2012 / Cilt: 13 - Sayı: 4

Türk rekabet hukukunda para cezaları: Piyango bitti mi?

Fines in Turkish competition law: Has the lottery ended?

Pages
45–96
DOI
—
🏛️Bibliographic metadata and full text access for this article are provided via DergiPark.
DergiPark Record ↗
✨

AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

In doing so, a comparative approach will be adopted to consider both the EU and Turkish competition law.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Monetary fines are one of the most important weapons at the competition authorities’ disposal.
📊
Key Findings & Data:Their main task is to deter undertakings from engaging in anti-competitive behaviour.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:In doing so, a comparative approach will be adopted to consider both the EU and Turkish competition law.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

Monetary fines are one of the most important weapons at the competition authorities’ disposal. Their main task is to deter undertakings from engaging in anti-competitive behaviour. In determining the appropriate level of fines in order to achieve this task, competition authorities encounter wide range of issues. In the advanced competition law regimes, adoption of a secondary legislation as to the method for setting fines is a crucial step in dealing with these issues. Recently introduced Fining Regulation in Turkish competition law clearly reflects this idea. Apart from aiming at providing transparency, consistency, and objectivity as to the methodology for setting fines, the Fining Regulation also allows for the imposition of more deterrent level of fines compared to pre-regulation era. Within this context, it is primarily questioned in this paper whether the Fining Regulation has fulfilled its objectives of providing transparency, consistency, and objectivity in the determination of fines. In doing so, a comparative approach will be adopted to consider both the EU and Turkish competition law.

Özet

Temel amaçları, tesebbüsleri rekabete aykırı davranışlarda bulunmaktan caydırmak olan para cezaları, rekabet otoritelerinin elindeki en önemli araçlardan bir tanesidir. Söz konusu amacın gerçekleştirebilmesi için gerekli olan ceza miktarının belirlenmesi sürecinde, rekabet otoriteleri birçok sorunla karşılaşmaktadırlar. Gelişmiş rekabet hukuku sistemlerinde, para cezalarına ilişkin ikincil mevzuatların kabul edilmesi, söz konusu sorunların çözümünde kritik bir öneme sahiptir. Türk rekabet hukukunda, yakın zamanda kabul edilen Para Cezaları Yönetmeliği, bu yaklaşımın bir ürünü olarak görülmektedir. Söz konusu Yönetmelik, para cezalarının belirlenmesi sürecinde seffaflık, tutarlılık ve nesnellik sağlamayı amaçlamasının yanı sıra daha caydırıcı para cezalarının uygulanabilmesine de olanak tanımaktadır. Bu çalışmada temel olarak, anılan Yönetmeliğin bahsi geçen seffaflık, tutarlılık ve nesnellik amaçlarını ne ölçüde gerçekleştirdiği ve beklentilere ne oranda karşılık verdiği, Avrupa Birliği rekabet hukuku uygulamasıyla karşılaştırmalı olarak irdelenmektedir.

🔖

Cite This Article

GÜNDÜZ, H. (2012). Türk rekabet hukukunda para cezaları: Piyango bitti mi?. Rekabet Dergisi, Cilt: 13 - Sayı: 4, 45–96. https://ajindex.com/articles/302745

📄 Full Text PDF Viewer

📄

PDF görüntüleyici hazırlanıyor...

References (14)

  1. ARI, H. (2009), “Recent Developments in the Enforcement of Turkish Competition Law: Fines and Leniency Regulation”, Antitrust Chronicle, Spring 2009, Volume 6, Number 1. ARI, H. and E. AYGUN (2009), “Regulation on Fines Adopted by Turkish Competition Authority: Footsteps of the New Era”, Competition Journal, 10(4), p. 7-71.
  2. BARENNES, M. and G. WOLF (2011), “Cartel Recidivism in the Mirror of EU Case Law”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2(5), p. 423-440.
  3. BECKER, G.S. (1968), “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), p. 169-217.
  4. CALVINO, N. (2007), “Public Enforcement in the EU: Deterrent Effect and Proportionality of Fines”, in European Competition Law Annual 2006: Enforcement of Prohibition of Cartels, p. 317-335,
  5. Eds. Ehlermann and Atanasiu, Hart Publishing, USA. CONNOR, J. M. (2011), “Has the European Commission Become More Severe in Punishing Cartels? Effects of the 2006 Guidelines”, ECLR, 32(1), p. 27-36.
  6. DE BROCA, H. (2006), “The Commission Revises Its Guidelines for Setting Fines in Antitrust Cases”, Competition Policy Newsletter, Autumn 2006, Number 3, p. 1-6.
  7. DE LA SERRE, E. B. and C. WINCKLER (2010), “Legal Issues Regarding Fines Imposed in EU Competition Proceedings”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 1(4), p. 327-347.
  8. DE LA SERRE, E. B. and C. WINCKLER (2011), “A Survey of Legal Issues Regarding Fines Imposed in EU Competition Proceedings (2010)”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2(4), p. 356-370.
  9. DE LA SERRE, E. B. and C. WINCKLER (2012), “A Landmark Year for the Law on Fines Imposed in EU Competition Proceedings”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 3(4), p. 351-370.
  10. DE LA TORRE, F. C. (2010), “The 2006 Guidelines on Fines: Reflections on Commission’s Practice”, World Competition, 33(3), p. 359-416.
  11. ERDEM, E. (2012), “Turkey: Regulation On Fines, An Illusion or A True Harmonization With The EU Law?”, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?article_id=181436, Date Accessed: 22.08.2012.
  12. EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1999), “XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy”, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/1998/en.pdf, Date Accessed: 22.08.2012.
  13. EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2011), “Factsheet: Fines for breaking competition law”, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/compliance/factsheet_fines_nov_2011_ en.pdf, Date Accessed: 22.08.2012.
  14. GERADIN, D. and D. HENRY (2005), “The EC Fining Policy for Violations of Competition Law: An Empirical Review of the