Journals / Rekabet Dergisi / 2011 / Cilt: 12 - Sayı: 2

Contribution in the search of a legal framework for a more effective international competition law

Daha etkin bir uluslararası rekabet için Hukuki çerçeve arayışı

Pages
91–163
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

As an answer to it, we are arguing that a plurilateral competition agreement with the appropriate content would be beneficial for both international trade and competition and the WTO would provide the optimal institutional vehicle for it.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:Despite globalisation, law and politics are still organised primarily on the basis of nation9states.
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Key Findings & Data:Domestic competition laws are not usually concerned with activity beyond territorial borders unless it has significant domestic effects.
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Conclusion & Impact:As an answer to it, we are arguing that a plurilateral competition agreement with the appropriate content would be beneficial for both international trade and competition and the WTO would provide the optimal institutional vehicle for it.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

Despite globalisation, law and politics are still organised primarily on the basis of nation9states. Competition law is one form of such regulation. Domestic competition laws are not usually concerned with activity beyond territorial borders unless it has significant domestic effects. This approach has created a suitable environment for the anti9competitive activities. More recently, States have sought to negotiate co9operation agreements in relation to competition law matters. As a result, attention has turned to the possibility of negotiating an international agreement on competition law. So, in our thesis, we examine the possibility of increasing the efficiency in international competition law. As an answer to it, we are arguing that a plurilateral competition agreement with the appropriate content would be beneficial for both international trade and competition and the WTO would provide the optimal institutional vehicle for it.

Özet

Küreselleşme olgusuna rağmen politika ve hukuk halen temelde ulus devletler tarafından düzenlenmektedir. Rekabet Hukuku da temel olarak ulus devlet tarafından düzenlenmekte ve konunun uluslararası boyutu eksik kalmaktadır. Ulusal rekabet kanunları, sınır ötesi aktivitelerle ancak ülke içerisinde ciddi bir etki doğurmaları halinde ilgilenmektedir. Bu durumun rekabete aykırı davranışlar için uygun bir ortam yarattığı gözlemlemek mümkündür. Son zamanlarda devletler, rekabet hukuku sorunları ile ilgili işbirliği anlaşmaları akdetme arayışına girmektedir. Bunun sonucu olarak ise bir uluslarası rekabet hukuku anlaşmasının gerekliliği konusu gündeme gelmiştir. Çalışmamızda, uluslararası rekabet hukukundaki mevcut durumun iyileştirilmesi yolları sorgulanmaktadır. Kanaatimizce içerik bakımından üye devletlerin egemenlikleri ile uyumlu plurilateral bir uluslararası anlaşmanın imzalanması hem Uluslararası Ticaret hem de rekabet hukuku açısından faydalı olacaktır. DTÖ ise böyle bir anlaşmanın akdedilmesi için en uygun kurumsal yapıyı sağlayacaktır.

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Cite This Article

KESKİN, A. C. (2011). Contribution in the search of a legal framework for a more effective international competition law. Rekabet Dergisi, Cilt: 12 - Sayı: 2, 91–163. https://ajindex.com/articles/302735

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References (3)

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