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Journals / Gazi University Journal of Science / 2017 / Cilt: 30 - Sayı: 4

EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNAL ATTACKS ON SCADA SYSTEMS

Erdal IRMAK
İsmail ERKEK
Mert Melih ÖZÇELİK
Pages
216–230
Publication Date
2017-12-11
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Experimental results show that although SCADA systems accomplish some mission critical tasks, the protocols used in their communication systems still lack of crucial security measures.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems play important role in electrical power system which is one of the most critical infrastructures.
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Key Findings & Data:They usually include digital controllers like PLCs to realize the automation of electromechanical processes and to accomplish the real time services.
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Conclusion & Impact:Experimental results show that although SCADA systems accomplish some mission critical tasks, the protocols used in their communication systems still lack of crucial security measures.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:SCADA · PLC Security · Cyber-attacks

Abstract

Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems play important role in electrical power system which is one of the most critical infrastructures. They usually include digital controllers like PLCs to realize the automation of electromechanical processes and to accomplish the real time services. Ensuring a secure communication between these field devices and the command center is vital from the security point of view. Because the most vulnerable part of SCADA systems is their communication protocols, this work focuses on the weaknesses of SCADA systems against the internal cyber-attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS), Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) and Replay. For this aim, a sample SCADA testbed environment has been designed at first and then the attacks mentioned above are tested on it. Experimental results show that although SCADA systems accomplish some mission critical tasks, the protocols used in their communication systems still lack of crucial security measures. Therefore, some immediate precautions to mitigate the vulnerabilities are suggested at the end of study.

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Cite This Article

IRMAK, E., ERKEK, İ., ÖZÇELİK, M. M. (2017). EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNAL ATTACKS ON SCADA SYSTEMS. Gazi University Journal of Science, Cilt: 30 - Sayı: 4, 216–230. https://ajindex.com/articles/254876

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