Journals / Felsefe Arkivi / 2012 / Sayı: 37

Locke’s Account of Liberty in the Essay: Can “Finite intellectual beings” be Free?

Pages
39–60
Publication Date
2012-12-31
DOI
—
🏛️Bibliographic metadata and full text access for this article are provided via DergiPark.
DergiPark Record ↗
✨

AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Finally the principle of “suspension of desire” as the condition of moral liberty is discussed.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The article deals with the evolution of Locke’s idea of liberty from its appearance in the first edition of the Essay up to its development in later editions.
📊
Key Findings & Data:Locke’s main moral problem is that how the natural abilities of human beings can be reconciled with their moral duties without referring to the doctrine of innateness of moral principles.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:Finally the principle of “suspension of desire” as the condition of moral liberty is discussed.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Özgürlük · güç · arzunun askıya alınması

Abstract

The article deals with the evolution of Locke’s idea of liberty from its appearance in the first edition of the Essay up to its development in later editions. Locke’s main moral problem is that how the natural abilities of human beings can be reconciled with their moral duties without referring to the doctrine of innateness of moral principles. The aim of this comparative study is to focus on the connection between this moral problem and the changes Locke made in the chapter “of Power” especially for the second edition. In the article, an account of the idea of power, of the difference Locke puts between voluntary actions and free actions are given. Following these, the question of determination of the will and the development of the answer to this question in the succession of editions are introduced. Finally the principle of “suspension of desire” as the condition of moral liberty is discussed.

Özet

Bu makale, Deneme’nin farklı edisyonları boyunca Locke’un özgürlük anlayışının gelişimini ele almaktadır. Locke’un en temel ahlaki problemi insanın doğal yetileri ile onun ahlaki ödevlerini, ahlaki ilkelerin doğuştan geldiğini savunan bir doktrine başvurmadan uzlaştırabilmektir. Deneme’nin özellikle birinci ve ikinci edisyonları arasındaki farklara odaklanan bu karşılaştırmalı çalışmanın amacı, Locke’un bu temel ahlaki problemi ile “Güç Üzerine” adlı bölümde yaptığı revizyonlar arasındaki bağlantıya odaklanmaktır. Makalede Locke’un güç anlayışı, iradi eylemler ile özgür eylemler arasında gözetilen fark ve de iradenin belirlenimi sorusuna verilen cevaptaki gelişim tartışılmaktadır. Son olarak ise, ahlaki özgürlüğün koşulu olarak “arzunun askıya alınması” ilkesi ele alınır.

🔖

Cite This Article

Canaslan, E. (2012). Locke’s Account of Liberty in the Essay: Can “Finite intellectual beings” be Free?. Felsefe Arkivi, Sayı: 37, 39–60. https://ajindex.com/articles/242364

📄 Full Text PDF Viewer

📄

PDF görüntüleyici hazırlanıyor...