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Journals / Akademik Yaklaşımlar Dergisi / 2013 / Cilt: 4 - Sayı: 2

Küreselleşme Sürecinde Fırsatçı Politik İş Çevrimi Modelinin Geçerliliği: OECD Ülkeleri Örneği

Ayşe ARI
Pages
64–83
Publication Date
2013-12-01
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

According to the results there exists opportunistic behaviors but it is at a very limited level

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Associating the economics and politics sciences political business cycle models explains the fluctuations of macroeconomic variables with the election periods.
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Key Findings & Data:But in recent years it is stated that the increase of international integration and institutional improvements as a result of the globalisation process, limited the manipulation of incumbent party to the economy in the sense of their own interest.
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Conclusion & Impact:According to the results there exists opportunistic behaviors but it is at a very limited level
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:2010 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Anahtar Kelimeler Politik İş Çevrimleri · Disiplin Etkisi · Küreselleşme

Abstract

Associating the economics and politics sciences political business cycle models explains the fluctuations of macroeconomic variables with the election periods. According to the opportunistic and partisan political business cycle models, political parties manipulate to the economy with the monetary and fiscal policy instruments before elections so as to get re-elected or implement ideolojical policies. But in recent years it is stated that the increase of international integration and institutional improvements as a result of the globalisation process, limited the manipulation of incumbent party to the economy in the sense of their own interest. The aim of this study is to investigate the validity of opportunustic political business cycle model during the globalisation process for the OECD countries over the period 1995-2010. To this end, dynamic panel data analysis is employed. According to the results there exists opportunistic behaviors but it is at a very limited level

Özet

Makro ekonomi ve politika bilimini ilişkilendiren politik iş çevrimi modelleri makro ekonomik değişkenlerde gözlenen dalgalanmaların nedenini seçim süreciyle açıklamaktadır. Fırsatçı ve partizan politik iş çevrimi modellerine göre siyasi partiler seçimleri tekrar kazanmak ya da ideolojik politikalar uygulayabilmek amacıyla seçim öncesinde ekonomiye para ve maliye politikası araçlarıyla müdahale etmektedir. Ancak son yıllarda küreselleşme süreciyle birlikte artan uluslararası bütünleşme ve kurumsal gelişmelerin iktidar partisinin çıkarları doğrultusunda ekonomiye müdahalesini kısıtladığı belirtilmektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı da küreselleşme sonrasında fırsatçı modelin geçerliliğini OECD ülkeleri için dinamik panel veri analizi kullanarak sorgulamaktır. 1995-2010 döneminin analiz edildiği çalışmadan elde edilen bulgular, seçim sürecinde fırsatçı davranışların gözlendiği yönündedir. Ancak fırsatçı güdülerle ekonomiye müdahalenin oldukça sınırlı düzeyde olduğu tespit edilmiştir.

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Cite This Article

ARI, A. (2013). Küreselleşme Sürecinde Fırsatçı Politik İş Çevrimi Modelinin Geçerliliği: OECD Ülkeleri Örneği. Akademik Yaklaşımlar Dergisi, Cilt: 4 - Sayı: 2, 64–83. https://ajindex.com/articles/2378

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