Journals / Uluslararası Politik Araştırmalar Dergisi / 2019 / Cilt: 5 - Sayı: 2

CHINA’S INFRASTRUCTURE DIPLOMACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: EXPLAINING ASYMMETRIC BARGAINING WITH FOUR ASEAN COUNTRIES

ÇİN’İN GÜNEYDOĞU ASYA’DAKİ ALTYAPI DİPLOMASİSİ: ASİMETRİK PAZARLIĞIN DÖRT ASEAN ÜLKESİ İLE AÇIKLANMASI

Pages
60–75
Publication Date
2019-08-31
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The increasing China-Japan competition provides economic opportunities but at the same time implies high security risks for individual ASEAN countries.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Existing studies on China’s infrastructure investment projects have largely focused on its geopolitical and geoeconomic implications by assuming that China will easily obtain support and cooperation from developing countries.
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Key Findings & Data:Since China’s infrastructure diplomacy is essentially based on gaining support from developing countries, possibility of strategic misalignment with them and political risks emanated from intensified strategic competition with other great powers create an opportunity for negotiations between China and each host country in itself.
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Conclusion & Impact:The increasing China-Japan competition provides economic opportunities but at the same time implies high security risks for individual ASEAN countries.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Çin · Altyapı Diplomasisi · Güneydoğu Asya

Abstract

Existing studies on China’s infrastructure investment projects have largely focused on its geopolitical and geoeconomic implications by assuming that China will easily obtain support and cooperation from developing countries. However, asymmetric power capabilities of China do not always imply that it would be able to achieve all desired outcomes at any time. Since China’s infrastructure diplomacy is essentially based on gaining support from developing countries, possibility of strategic misalignment with them and political risks emanated from intensified strategic competition with other great powers create an opportunity for negotiations between China and each host country in itself. Using an analytical framework from the bargaining theory in international relations, this article argues that Southeast Asian countries are able to increase their bargaining leverage vis-a-vis China. The success of China’s infrastructure diplomacy depends on the combination of three factors, such as strategic location, outside option and domestic constraints, affecting political bargaining processes between China and Southeast Asian countries. In this context, the future prospect of regional cooperation is likely to be shaped by the interactions between different development and connectivity plans in Southeast Asia. The increasing China-Japan competition provides economic opportunities but at the same time implies high security risks for individual ASEAN countries.

Özet

Çin’in altyapı yatırımı projelerinin jeopolitik ve jeoekonomik etkileri üzerine odaklanan çalışmaların büyük çoğunluğu, gelişmekte olan ülkelerden ihtiyaç duyduğu destek ve işbirliğini Çin’in kolaylıkla elde edebileceğini varsaymaktadır. Ne var ki, Çin’in sahip olduğu asimetrik güç yetenekleri diğer ülkelerle ilişkilerinde her zaman arzu ettiği çıktıları elde edebileceği anlamına gelmez. Çin’in altyapı diplomasisi özünde gelişmekte olan ülkelerden politik destek elde etmeyi amaçladığından, söz konusu ülkelerle ortaya çıkabilecek stratejik uyumsuzluk ihtimali ve diğer büyük güçlerle yaşanan yoğunlaşmış stratejik rekabetten kaynaklanan politik riskler Çin ve ev sahibi ülke arasında yapılacak müzakereler için önemli bir fırsat yaratmaktadır. Bu makalede uluslararası ilişkilerde pazarlık teorisine dayanan analitik bir çerçeve kullanılarak Güneydoğu Asya ülkelerinin, Çin karşısında pazarlık gücünü artırabilecekleri iddia edilmektedir. Çin’in altyapı diplomasisinin başarısı, Çin ve Güneydoğu Asya ülkeleri arasında var olan politik pazarlık süreçlerini etkileyen üç önemli faktör olan stratejik konum, dış seçenek ve içsel kısıtların birleşimine bağlı olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu bağlamda Güneydoğu Asya bölgesel işbirliğinin geleceğinin birbirinden farklı kalkınma ve bağlantısallık planları arasındaki etkileşimlerle şekillenmesi kuvvetle muhtemeldir. Giderek artan Çin-Japonya rekabeti, bireysel ASEAN ülkeleri için önemli ekonomik fırsatlar sunduğu gibi ciddi güvenlik riskleri de barındırmaktadır.

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Cite This Article

TÜTER, M. (2019). CHINA’S INFRASTRUCTURE DIPLOMACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: EXPLAINING ASYMMETRIC BARGAINING WITH FOUR ASEAN COUNTRIES. Uluslararası Politik Araştırmalar Dergisi, Cilt: 5 - Sayı: 2, 60–75. https://ajindex.com/articles/221018

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