Journals / Insight Turkey / 2020 / Cilt: 22 - Sayı: 4

The UAE’s Disruptive Policy in Libya

Pages
157–177
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

It highlights the UAE’s efforts to weave regional and international alliances to support Haftar and tries to answer the questions why Abu Dhabi has been able to act with impunity in Libya despite being the top foreign player fueling the war there for many years, and whether it will be able to achieve its goals and continue its interventions in the oil-rich North African country or not.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:In the last decade, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as a leading counter-revolutionary force in the Middle East.
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Key Findings & Data:After succeeding in Egypt in 2013, Abu Dhabi decided to support field marshal and warlord Khalifa Haftar in Libya to overthrow the UN-recognized government in Tripoli, take over power, and control Libya by force.
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Conclusion & Impact:It highlights the UAE’s efforts to weave regional and international alliances to support Haftar and tries to answer the questions why Abu Dhabi has been able to act with impunity in Libya despite being the top foreign player fueling the war there for many years, and whether it will be able to achieve its goals and continue its interventions in the oil-rich North African country or not.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:2013 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Özet

In the last decade, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as a leading counter-revolutionary force in the Middle East. Feeling the heat of change in the region, the small, oil-rich Gulf country adopted an aggressive foreign policy that defined the UAE as a disruptive force that aims to reverse the fledgling democratic trend in the Middle East. After succeeding in Egypt in 2013, Abu Dhabi decided to support field marshal and warlord Khalifa Haftar in Libya to overthrow the UN-recognized government in Tripoli, take over power, and control Libya by force. To that end, the UAE offered massive military, financial, and diplomatic support to Haftar. In this context, the present paper aims to discuss the UAE’s interventions in Libya in terms of their nature, extent, motives, goals and repercussions. It highlights the UAE’s efforts to weave regional and international alliances to support Haftar and tries to answer the questions why Abu Dhabi has been able to act with impunity in Libya despite being the top foreign player fueling the war there for many years, and whether it will be able to achieve its goals and continue its interventions in the oil-rich North African country or not.

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Cite This Article

BAKIR, A. (2020). The UAE’s Disruptive Policy in Libya. Insight Turkey, Cilt: 22 - Sayı: 4, 157–177. https://ajindex.com/articles/198540

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