Journals / Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science / 2015 / Cilt: 23 - Sayı: 4

RFID card security for public transportation applications based on a novel neural network analysis of cardholder behavior characteristics

Pages
1098–1110
Publication Date
2015-08-13
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Our proposed security approach with neural network forecasting is applied with success to the Turkish public transport without an online backend system.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This paper proposes a novel approach that applies neural network forecasting to security for closed-loop prepaid cards based on low-cost technologies such as RFID and 1-Wire.
📊
Key Findings & Data:The effects of the network architecture, the number of neurons, the training algorithm, and the prediction performance function on the recharge day forecast are investigated.
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Conclusion & Impact:Our proposed security approach with neural network forecasting is applied with success to the Turkish public transport without an online backend system.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Low-cost · RFID · prepaid card

Abstract

This paper proposes a novel approach that applies neural network forecasting to security for closed-loop prepaid cards based on low-cost technologies such as RFID and 1-Wire. The security vulnerability of low-cost RFID closed-loop prepaid card systems originates mostly from the card itself. Criminal organizations counterfeit or clone card data. Although high-security prepaid cards exist, they are often too expensive for transport ticketing, and even their security is not guaranteed for a well-defined period of time. Therefore, data encryption systems are used widely against counterfeiting with success. However, it has not been possible to develop countermeasures with comparable success against cloning. Our proposed security application uses neural network forecasting to determine the recharge day behavioral characteristics of the cardholder and predict the next time the cardholder will recharge their card. Based on the prediction for the recharge time, the expiration date of the low-cost RFID prepaid card is defined, which is a good countermeasure against cloning. FTDNN, LRNN, and NARX network architectures with one hidden layer are considered in this research. The effects of the network architecture, the number of neurons, the training algorithm, and the prediction performance function on the recharge day forecast are investigated. Experimental results confirm the accuracy of the recharge time forecast and confirm countermeasures against cloning. Our proposed security approach with neural network forecasting is applied with success to the Turkish public transport without an online backend system.

Özet

This paper proposes a novel approach that applies neural network forecasting to security for closed-loop prepaid cards based on low-cost technologies such as RFID and 1-Wire. The security vulnerability of low-cost RFID closed-loop prepaid card systems originates mostly from the card itself. Criminal organizations counterfeit or clone card data. Although high-security prepaid cards exist, they are often too expensive for transport ticketing, and even their security is not guaranteed for a well-defined period of time. Therefore, data encryption systems are used widely against counterfeiting with success. However, it has not been possible to develop countermeasures with comparable success against cloning. Our proposed security application uses neural network forecasting to determine the recharge day behavioral characteristics of the cardholder and predict the next time the cardholder will recharge their card. Based on the prediction for the recharge time, the expiration date of the low-cost RFID prepaid card is defined, which is a good countermeasure against cloning. FTDNN, LRNN, and NARX network architectures with one hidden layer are considered in this research. The effects of the network architecture, the number of neurons, the training algorithm, and the prediction performance function on the recharge day forecast are investigated. Experimental results confirm the accuracy of the recharge time forecast and confirm countermeasures against cloning. Our proposed security approach with neural network forecasting is applied with success to the Turkish public transport without an online backend system.

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Cite This Article

DÜZENLİ, G. (2015). RFID card security for public transportation applications based on a novel neural network analysis of cardholder behavior characteristics. Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Cilt: 23 - Sayı: 4, 1098–1110. https://ajindex.com/articles/187590

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