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Journals / Journal of Research in Economics / 2026 / Volume: 10 Issue: 2

GEOPOLITICAL ALIGNMENT AND CENTRAL BANK GOLD ACCUMULATION: EVIDENCE OF CONCENTRATION, NOT COORDINATION

Tuğba Ortay Baykal(ISTANBUL COMMERCE UNIVERSITY)0009-0001-1414-2523
Pages
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Publication Date
2026-10-20
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Contrary to theoretical expectations and policy discourse surrounding de-dollarisation, geopolitical alignment does not systematically predict central bank gold purchases; these purchases instead reflect sanctions-specific hedging by a small number of directly affected states and broad-based portfolio diversification across the geopolitical spectrum.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:In theory, gold is the natural hedge against geopolitical risk: it has no issuer, carries no counterparty risk, and cannot be frozen by foreign authorities when held domestically.
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Key Findings & Data:Yet central bank gold accumulation is extraordinarily concentrated: Russia, China, and Türkiye account for over 100% of net purchases since 2002, while the remaining countries are net sellers in aggregate.
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Conclusion & Impact:Contrary to theoretical expectations and policy discourse surrounding de-dollarisation, geopolitical alignment does not systematically predict central bank gold purchases; these purchases instead reflect sanctions-specific hedging by a small number of directly affected states and broad-based portfolio diversification across the geopolitical spectrum.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:2002 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Gold reserves · Central banks · De-dollarisation

Abstract

In theory, gold is the natural hedge against geopolitical risk: it has no issuer, carries no counterparty risk, and cannot be frozen by foreign authorities when held domestically. Countries more exposed to confrontation with the United States should therefore be expected to accumulate more gold. Yet central bank gold accumulation is extraordinarily concentrated: Russia, China, and Türkiye account for over 100% of net purchases since 2002, while the remaining countries are net sellers in aggregate. This study employs Bailey-Strezhnev-Voeten ideal point estimates for 129 countries over the period 2002 to 2024 to test whether United Nations General Assembly voting distance from the United States predicts gold accumulation. A panel data framework with year fixed effects and country-clustered standard errors is estimated, controlling for BRICS/SCO membership, sanctions exposure, reserve levels, inflation, and GDP growth. The coefficient on UN voting distance is not statistically significant once BRICS/SCO membership and sanctions are controlled for (p = 0.85), nor when only BRICS/ SCO membership is controlled for (p = 0.41). When the three largest accumulators are excluded, the effect attains only marginal significance (p = 0.09). Robustness checks, including two-way fixed effects, sub-period analysis, and falsification tests using total reserves as a placebo outcome, confirm the fragility of this relationship. In the post-2022 period, NATO members, particularly Poland, emerged as leading purchasers, accumulating 559 tonnes compared with 392 tonnes by BRICS/SCO countries. The principal contribution is therefore a null result. Contrary to theoretical expectations and policy discourse surrounding de-dollarisation, geopolitical alignment does not systematically predict central bank gold purchases; these purchases instead reflect sanctions-specific hedging by a small number of directly affected states and broad-based portfolio diversification across the geopolitical spectrum.

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Cite This Article

Baykal, T. O. (2026). GEOPOLITICAL ALIGNMENT AND CENTRAL BANK GOLD ACCUMULATION: EVIDENCE OF CONCENTRATION, NOT COORDINATION. Journal of Research in Economics, Volume: 10 Issue: 2. https://doi.org/10.29228/JORE.56

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