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Journals / Global Media Journal Turkish Edition / 2025 / Cilt: 16 Sayı: 31

Populist Political Communication and New Media: A Comparative Analysis of Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders’ Digital Emotion Mobilization

Popülist Siyasal İletişim ve Yeni Medya: Marine Le Pen ve Geert Wilders’ın Dijital Duygu Mobilizasyonunun Karşılaştırmalı Analizi

Veli Özdemir(ISIK UNIVERSITY, FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)0000-0001-7694-5818
Pages
120–145
Publication Date
2025-12-31
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The article also discusses how populist political communication, together with new media, reshapes democratic representation.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Politics, which has traditionally been explained through ideological frameworks, party programmes, or class-based representations, has increasingly become an emotional, communication-driven competition, particularly with the rise of populism.
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Key Findings & Data:The central research question of this study is to examine how the social media preferences of right-wing populist opposition actors shape the emotional dimensions of their discourse, their political communication strategies, and the relationship they establish with voters.
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Conclusion & Impact:The article also discusses how populist political communication, together with new media, reshapes democratic representation.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:2021 Verileri
⚙️Variables:siyasal iletişim · popülist strateji · duygusal mobilizasyon

Abstract

Politics, which has traditionally been explained through ideological frameworks, party programmes, or class-based representations, has increasingly become an emotional, communication-driven competition, particularly with the rise of populism. The central research question of this study is to examine how the social media preferences of right-wing populist opposition actors shape the emotional dimensions of their discourse, their political communication strategies, and the relationship they establish with voters. The article aims to explain the populist political communication preferences used against governments, the strategic choices underlying these preferences, and the reasons for their emotional differentiation. In this context, the discourse of Marine Le Pen, the leader of the Rassemblement National (RN) in Western Europe, and Geert Wilders, the leader of the Party for Freedom (PVV), has been selected for analysis. The data were collected from speeches, interviews, social media accounts, and official statements produced between 2021 and 2025. In the article, populist political communication, emotion mobilization, and system levels are conceptualised, and the data are analysed qualitatively. The article's main argument is that although opposition leaders employ similar political communication strategies against governments, their modes of emotional mobilization differ. The article also discusses how populist political communication, together with new media, reshapes democratic representation.

Özet

İdeolojik çerçeveler, parti programları veya sınıfsal temsiller üzerinden açıklanan siyaset, popülizmin de yükselmesiyle birlikte günümüzde giderek daha fazla duygusal ve bir iletişim rekabetine dönüşmüştür. Bu çalışmanın temel araştırma sorusu, sağ popülist muhalefetin sosyal medya tercihlerinin söylemlerindeki duygusal boyutları, siyasal iletişim stratejilerini ve seçmenle kurdukları ilişkiyi nasıl şekillendirdiğini incelemektir. Makalenin amacı ise iktidarlara karşı kullanılan popülist siyasal iletişim tercihlerini, stratejik seçimlerini ve duygusal farklılaşma nedenini açıklamaktır. Bu bağlamda Batı Avrupa'dan Ulusal Birlik Partisi (Rassemblement National - RN) lideri Marine Le Pen ve Özgürlük Partisi (Party for Freedom- PVV) lideri Geert Wilders'ın söylemleri analiz için seçilmiştir. Veriler 2021- 2025 yılları arasında yapılmış konuşmalardan, röportajlardan, sosyal medya hesaplarından ve resmî açıklamalarından toplanmıştır. Makalede popülist siyasal iletişim, duygu mobilizasyonu ve sistem düzeyleri kavramsallaştırılmış ve veriler nitel içerik analiz kullanılarak karşılaştırılmıştır. Makalenin temel argümanı, muhalif liderlerin iktidarlara karşı benzer siyasal iletişim stratejilerini kullanmakla birlikte duygu mobilizasyonlarınının farklılaştığıdır. Ayrıca makalede popülist siyasal iletişimin yeni medya ile birlikte demokratik temsilleri yeniden nasıl şekillendirdiği tartışılmıştır.

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Cite This Article

Özdemir, V. (2025). Populist Political Communication and New Media: A Comparative Analysis of Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders’ Digital Emotion Mobilization. Global Media Journal Turkish Edition, Cilt: 16 Sayı: 31, 120–145. https://ajindex.com/articles/1645250

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