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Journals / Yönetim ve Ekonomi: Celal Bayar Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi / 2014 / Cilt: 21 - Sayı: 2

Agency and Transparency in Financial Markets

Finansal Piyasalarda Vekillik ve Şeffaflık

Sadettin ÇİTÇİ
Pages
269–279
Publication Date
2015-10-14
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

More information about the portfolio return before renewal of management agreement also decreases expected return, while, conditionally, it may provide more information about manager's actual ability.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:We analyze incentive effects of transparency on delegated portfolio management.
📊
Key Findings & Data:When portfolio return is observable, disclosure of portfolio composition decreases expected return and lowers the investor's ability to identify the manager's actual type.
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Conclusion & Impact:More information about the portfolio return before renewal of management agreement also decreases expected return, while, conditionally, it may provide more information about manager's actual ability.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:şeffaflık · kariyer kaygısı · yetkilendirilmiş portföy yönetimi

Abstract

We analyze incentive effects of transparency on delegated portfolio management. When portfolio return is observable, disclosure of portfolio composition decreases expected return and lowers the investor's ability to identify the manager's actual type. More information about the portfolio return before renewal of management agreement also decreases expected return, while, conditionally, it may provide more information about manager's actual ability.

Özet

Bu çalışmada finansal piyasalardaki şeffaflığın (kamuyu aydınlatmanın) yetkilendirilmiş portföy yönetimi üzerindeki teşvik etkileri analiz edilmiştir. Portföy getirisinin gözlemlenebilir olduğu durumda, portföy kompozisyonunun ifşa edilmesi, portföyün beklenen getirisini düşürmekte ve yatırımcının portföy yöneticisinin gerçek yatırım kabiliyetini de öğrenmesini güçleştirmektedir. Portföy yönetim anlaşmasının yenilenmesinden önce yatırımcının portföy getirisini gözlemlemesi de, portföyün beklenen getirisini düşürmekte, fakat bazı şartlara bağlı olarak yatırımcının portföy yöneticisinin yatırım kabiliyeti hakkında daha fazla bilgi edinmesini sağlamaktadır

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Cite This Article

ÇİTÇİ, S. (2015). Agency and Transparency in Financial Markets. Yönetim ve Ekonomi: Celal Bayar Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 21 - Sayı: 2, 269–279. https://ajindex.com/articles/15383

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