Journals / Central Bank Review / 2013 / Cilt: 13 - Sayı: 2

Para politikasının potansiyel araçları

The potential instruments of monetary policy

Pages
1–15
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

If that should not be enough, then have the Central Bank buy bank bonds, and, if yet more is required, try forcible dilution, whereby the authorities injects more equity into those banks which are failing to expand.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Although nominal interest rates are constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB), Central Banks can increase the monetary base (M0), e.g. by Quantitative Easing (QE).
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Key Findings & Data:But the link, money multiplier, between M0 and the wider monetary aggregates has collapsed.
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Conclusion & Impact:If that should not be enough, then have the Central Bank buy bank bonds, and, if yet more is required, try forcible dilution, whereby the authorities injects more equity into those banks which are failing to expand.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

Although nominal interest rates are constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB), Central Banks can increase the monetary base (M0), e.g. by Quantitative Easing (QE). But the link, money multiplier, between M0 and the wider monetary aggregates has collapsed. Although QE was, nevertheless, originally successful, it is now largely a spent force. It could be given some additional power by complementing it with reductions in interest payments on (marginal) excess reserves (IOER). But neither will have any significant effect in raising bank lending to the private sector. In order to kick start that, one should aim to lower bank marginal funding costs. The Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS) is a good start. If that should not be enough, then have the Central Bank buy bank bonds, and, if yet more is required, try forcible dilution, whereby the authorities injects more equity into those banks which are failing to expand.

Özet

Nominal faiz oranlarının sıfırla sınırlı olmasına rağmen merkez bankaları, niceliksel genişleme örneğinde olduğu gibi para tabanını (M0) artırabilirler. Ancak, M0 ve daha geniş tanımlı parasal büyüklükler arasındaki bağ, para çarpanı, başarısız olmuştur. Niceliksel genişleme başlangıçta başarılı olmasına rağmen artık büyük ölçüde boşa harcanan bir kuvvettir. Niceliksel genişlemeye (marjinal) fazla rezervler üzerinden alınan faiz ödemelerinin azaltılmasıyla tamamlanarak destek verilebilir. Fakat bunların hiçbirinin özel sektöre verilen banka kredilerini artırmada önemli bir etkisi olmayacaktır. Söz konusu kredileri harekete geçirmek için daha düşük banka marjinal fonlama maliyeti amaçlanmalıdır. Krediye Yönelik Fonlama Planı iyi bir başlangıçtır. Eğer bu yeterli olmazsa merkez bankasının banka tahvili alması sağlanır ve eğer daha fazlası gerekirse, kredi genişlemesinde başarısız bankalara otoritelerin daha fazla öz kaynak enjekte etmeleri vasıtasıyla etkili seyreltme denenir.

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Cite This Article

GOODHART, C. A. E. (2013). Para politikasının potansiyel araçları. Central Bank Review, Cilt: 13 - Sayı: 2, 1–15. https://ajindex.com/articles/148721

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