Journals / Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy / 2020 / Cilt: 10 - Sayı: 2

Philosophical and Psychological Analysis of Memory Criterion in Personal Identity Problem

Kişisel Özdeşlik Probleminde Bellek Ölçütünün Felsefi ve Psikolojik Yönden İncelenmesi

Pages
677–702
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

It will be noted that memory systems have evolved to assist future planned behavior and will be claimed that memory systems have no purpose to provide personal identity.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:In the problem of personal identity, the necessary and sufficient conditions that allow the person to perceive themselves as the same person despite all the changes over time are questioned.
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Key Findings & Data:The theories that try to explain the problem of personal identity can be examined under two main headings; reductionist and nonreductivist theories.
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Conclusion & Impact:It will be noted that memory systems have evolved to assist future planned behavior and will be claimed that memory systems have no purpose to provide personal identity.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

In the problem of personal identity, the necessary and sufficient conditions that allow the person to perceive themselves as the same person despite all the changes over time are questioned. The theories that try to explain the problem of personal identity can be examined under two main headings; reductionist and nonreductivist theories. Nonreductive theories deny that personal identity can be explained by reducing it to simpler sub-processes. Reductionist theories suggest that personal identity can be explained by reducing to physical or psychological sub-processes. The memory criterion is considered to be cyclical because it has to be accepted that the person is the same person as the past person to remember his or her own past. In order to circumvent the cyclic argument, the Quasy-memory argument is proposed. The quasi-memory argument is based mainly on the assumption that the person who experiences a past event and the person who remembers it does not have to be the same person. It will be noted that memory systems have evolved to assist future planned behavior and will be claimed that memory systems have no purpose to provide personal identity.

Özet

Kişisel özdeşlik probleminde, zaman içindeki tüm değişimlere karşın kişinin, kendini aynı kişi olarak algılamasını sağlayan şartların gerekli ve yeterli koşulları sorgulanmaktadır. Kişisel özdeşlik sorununu açıklamaya çalışan kuramlar, indirgemeci ve indirgemeci olmayan kuramlar şeklinde iki ana başlıkta incelenebilir. İndirgemeci olmayan kuramlar, kişisel özdeşliğin daha basit alt süreçlere indirgenerek açıklanabileceğini reddeder. İndirgemeci kuramlar ise kişisel özdeşliğin fiziksel veya psikolojik olarak daha alt süreçlere indirgenerek açıklanabileceğini ileri sürer. Bellek ölçütünde, kişinin kendi geçmişini hatırlaması için, geçmişteki kişi ile aynı kişi olmasının baştan kabul edilmesi zorunluluğu nedeniyle, bellek ölçütünün döngüsel olduğu kabul edilmektedir. Döngüsellik argümanını aşmak için Quasi-memory (Q bellek) argümanı ileri sürülmüştür. Quasimemory argümanı esas olarak geçmişteki bir olayı yaşayan kişi ile hatırlayan kişinin aynı kişi olmak zorunda olmadığı kabülüne dayanmaktadır. Bu makalede Quasi-memory argümanını savunan ve karşı çıkan görüşler, felsefi açıdan ve modern nöropskolojinin bellek teorileri dikkate alınarak incelenecektir. Bellek sistemlerinin geleceğe yönelik planlı davranışa yardımcı olmak üzere evrimleştiğine dikkat çekilecek ve belleğin kişisel özdeşlik sağlamak gibi bir amacı olmadığı ortaya konulacaktır.

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Cite This Article

PREDKO, D., ERGÜL, T. (2020). Philosophical and Psychological Analysis of Memory Criterion in Personal Identity Problem. Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy, Cilt: 10 - Sayı: 2, 677–702. https://ajindex.com/articles/142068

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