Journals / Akdeniz İİBF Dergisi / 2025 / Cilt: 25 Sayı: 2

An Examination of German Defense and Security Policy: Is Germany Back?

Alman Savunma ve Güvenlik Politikasına Dair Bir İnceleme: Almanya Geri Mi Döndü?

Orkun Sürücüoğlu(MANİSA CELÂL BAYAR ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0002-0930-0013
Kahraman Süvari(MANİSA CELÂL BAYAR ÜNİVERSİTESİ, İKTİSADİ VE İDARİ BİLİMLER FAKÜLTESİ, SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER BÖLÜMÜ (İNGİLİZCE))0000-0002-8137-9010
Pages
70–85
Publication Date
2025-11-17
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

This article argues that Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2022 constitutes a turning point for Germany’s security approach and discusses the change in this area in the context of the factors shaping defense and security policy.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The Federal Republic of Germany, founded after World War II, has formed its defense and security policies within the framework of a pacifist and multilateral approach under the influence of external and internal factors.
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Key Findings & Data:Becoming a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955 provided the basis for this approach by ensuring the national security of the Federal Republic of Germany, and this situation also shaped the German strategic culture during the Cold War.
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Conclusion & Impact:This article argues that Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2022 constitutes a turning point for Germany’s security approach and discusses the change in this area in the context of the factors shaping defense and security policy.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:2014 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Almanya · Savunma ve Güvenlik Politikası · Stratejik Kültür

Abstract

The Federal Republic of Germany, founded after World War II, has formed its defense and security policies within the framework of a pacifist and multilateral approach under the influence of external and internal factors. Becoming a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955 provided the basis for this approach by ensuring the national security of the Federal Republic of Germany, and this situation also shaped the German strategic culture during the Cold War. This understanding, which allowed for the development of trade relations with Russia, also contributed to the growth of the German economy, where international trade is of great importance. However, the increasing pressures for change in Germany’s foreign and security policy, centered on the United States and the European Union, which began with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, reached their peak with Russia’s attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022. This article argues that Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2022 constitutes a turning point for Germany’s security approach and discusses the change in this area in the context of the factors shaping defense and security policy.

Özet

İkinci Dünya Savaşı’ndan sonra kurulan Almanya Federal Cumhuriyeti, savunma ve güvenlik politikalarını dış ve iç faktörlerin etkisiyle pasifist ve çok taraflı bir yaklaşım çerçevesinde oluşturmuştur. 1955 yılında Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü (NATO) üyesi olunması Federal Almanya’nın ulusal güvenliğini teminat altına alarak bu yaklaşıma dayanak sağlamış ve bu durum Soğuk Savaş sürecinde Alman stratejik kültürünü de şekillendirmiştir. Rusya ile ticari ilişkilerin geliştirilmesine olanak tanıyan bu anlayış, uluslararası ticaretin büyük bir önem taşıdığı Alman ekonomisinin büyümesine de katkı sağlamıştır. Bununla birlikte Rusya’nın 2014 yılında Kırım’ı ilhakı ile başlayan süreçte, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Avrupa Birliği merkezli olmak üzere Almanya’nın dış ve güvenlik politikasında değişime yönelik artan baskılar, Rusya’nın Ukrayna’ya 24 Şubat 2022 tarihindeki saldırısı ile doruk noktasına ulaşmıştır. Bu makalede Rusya’nın Ukrayna’ya 2022 yılındaki saldırısının Almanya’nın güvenlik yaklaşımı için bir dönüm noktası teşkil ettiği ileri sürülmüş ve bu alandaki değişim savunma ve güvenlik politikasını şekillendiren unsurlar ekseninde tartışılmıştır.

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Cite This Article

Sürücüoğlu, O., Süvari, K. (2025). An Examination of German Defense and Security Policy: Is Germany Back?. Akdeniz İİBF Dergisi, Cilt: 25 Sayı: 2, 70–85. https://doi.org/10.25294/auiibfd.1677052

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