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Journals / Muhasebe ve Denetime Bakış / 2021 / Cilt: 21 Sayı: 63

MOTIVATIONS SOURCES FOR EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION ON COMPANIES TRADED IN BORSA ISTANBUL

KAZANÇ YÖNETİMİNİN MOTİVASYON KAYNAKLARI VE KURUMSAL YÖNETİM: BORSA İSTANBUL’DA İŞLEM GÖREN ŞİRKETLER ÜZERİNE AMPİRİK BİR İNCELEME

Gülhan Suadiye(HATAY MUSTAFA KEMAL ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0003-2619-2146
Pages
223–248
Publication Date
2021-04-01
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The analysis results showed that firm-specific economic conditions such as profitability, leverage level and capital increase motivate firms to manage earnings, while firm size constrains earnings management.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:In this study, the motivations of earnings management and the effects of corporate governance structure on earnings management were empirically examined by using the annual data of companies traded in Borsa Istanbul (BIST) between 2005 and 2018.
📊
Key Findings & Data:The analysis results showed that firm-specific economic conditions such as profitability, leverage level and capital increase motivate firms to manage earnings, while firm size constrains earnings management.
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Conclusion & Impact:Finally, the market value of firm and the managerial ownership have no positive or negative effects on earnings management.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:2005 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Kazanç Yönetimi · Kazanç Yönetimi Motivasyonları · Kurumsal Yönetim.

Abstract

In this study, the motivations of earnings management and the effects of corporate governance structure on earnings management were empirically examined by using the annual data of companies traded in Borsa Istanbul (BIST) between 2005 and 2018. The analysis results showed that firm-specific economic conditions such as profitability, leverage level and capital increase motivate firms to manage earnings, while firm size constrains earnings management. The analysis results for the effects of corporate governance characteristics on earnings management revealed that the board size and the external audit quality are effective in limiting earnings management, but CEO duality and the independence of audit committee do not restrict earnings management practices. The independence of board and the institutional ownership have restrictive effects on earnings management practices but not statistically significant. Finally, the market value of firm and the managerial ownership have no positive or negative effects on earnings management.

Özet

Bu çalışmada, 2005-2018 yılları arasında Borsa İstanbul (BİST)’da sürekli işlem gören firmaların yıllık verileri kullanılarak kazanç yönetiminin motivasyon kaynakları ve kurumsal yönetim yapısının kazanç yönetimi üzerindeki etkileri ampirik olarak incelenmiştir. Yapılan analizde karlılık, borçlanma düzeyi ve sermaye artırımı gibi firmaya özgü ekonomik durumların firmaları kazançlarını yönetmeye teşvik ettiği, firma büyüklüğünün ise kazanç yönetimini sınırlandırdığı tespit edilmiştir. Kurumsal yönetim özelliklerinin kazanç yönetimi üzerindeki etkisine dair yapılan analizde ise yönetim kurulu büyüklüğü ve dış denetim kalitesinin kazanç yönetimini sınırlandırmada etkili olduğu ancak CEO ikiliği ve denetim komitesi bağımsızlığının kazanç yönetimini sınırlandırmadığı ortaya çıkmıştır. Yönetim kurulu bağımsızlığı ve kurumsal sahipliğin kazanç yönetimi uygulamalarını sınırlandırıcı etkisi istatistiksel açıdan anlamlı bulunamamıştır. Son olarak, firma piyasa değeri ile yönetici sahipliğinin kazanç yönetimi üzerinde olumlu veya olumsuz herhangi bir etkisi bulunamamıştır.

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Cite This Article

Suadiye, G., *, G. S. (2021). MOTIVATIONS SOURCES FOR EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION ON COMPANIES TRADED IN BORSA ISTANBUL. Muhasebe ve Denetime Bakış, Cilt: 21 Sayı: 63, 223–248. https://ajindex.com/articles/1294845

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