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Journals / Muhasebe ve Denetime Bakış / 2026 / Cilt: 23 Sayı: 69

A RECOMMENDATION TO STRENGTHEN THE AUDITOR’S INDEPENDENCE: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INSURANCE

DENETÇİNİN BAĞIMSIZLIĞINI GÜÇLENDİRMEYE YÖNELİK BİR ÖNERİ: FİNANSAL TABLOLARIN SİGORTALANMASI

Recep Güneş(ARTVİN ÇORUH ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0003-3813-2749
Ahmet Onay(Eskişehir Teknik Üniversitesi)0000-0003-1182-6003
Pages
67–84
Publication Date
2023-05-10
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The results of the study showed that financial statements insurance, a model based on the “laissez-faire” principle, has motivations that encourage the improvement of audit quality and financial reporting quality.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The inherent conflicts of interest in the auditor-manager relationships are the source of the problems that auditing faces.
📊
Key Findings & Data:The definitive solution to these problems is not to limit the relations between the two parties with regulations, but to completely eliminate them.
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Conclusion & Impact:The results of the study showed that financial statements insurance, a model based on the “laissez-faire” principle, has motivations that encourage the improvement of audit quality and financial reporting quality.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Vekalet Problemi · Denetimin Bağımsızlığı · Denetim Kalitesi

Abstract

The inherent conflicts of interest in the auditor-manager relationships are the source of the problems that auditing faces. The definitive solution to these problems is not to limit the relations between the two parties with regulations, but to completely eliminate them. The idea of financial statements insurance serves this purpose. In this study, the basic rationales of the financial statements insurance are discussed and an implementation model is introduced. In addition, the impact of financial statements insurance on auditing and financial reporting quality is explained, and a theoretical discussion is presented from an unusual perspective to researchers and regulators who aim to find solutions to auditing problems. The results of the study showed that financial statements insurance, a model based on the “laissez-faire” principle, has motivations that encourage the improvement of audit quality and financial reporting quality.

Özet

Denetçi-yönetici ilişkilerindeki doğal çıkar çatışmaları, denetimin karşı karşıya olduğu problemlerin kaynağıdır. Bu problemlerin kesin çözümü, iki taraf arasındaki ilişkilerin düzenlemelerle sınırlandırılması değil tamamen ortadan kaldırılmasıdır. Finansal tabloların sigortalanması fikri, bu amaca hizmet eder. Bu çalışmada, finansal tabloların sigortalanmasının temel gerekçeleri tartışılmış ve bir uygulama modeli tanıtılmıştır. Ayrıca finansal tabloların sigortalanmasının denetim ve finansal raporlama kalitesi üzerindeki etkisi açıklanmış ve denetimin problemlerine çözüm üretmeyi amaçlayan araştırmacılara ve düzenleyicilere olağandışı bir bakış açısı üzerinden teorik bir tartışma sunulmuştur. Çalışmanın sonuçları, “bırakınız yapsınlar” ilkesine dayanan bir model olan finansal tabloların sigortalanmasının, denetim kalitesinin ve finansal raporlama kalitesinin artırılmasını teşvik eden motivasyonlara sahip olduğunu göstermiştir.

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Cite This Article

Güneş, R., Onay, A. (2023). A RECOMMENDATION TO STRENGTHEN THE AUDITOR’S INDEPENDENCE: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INSURANCE. Muhasebe ve Denetime Bakış, Cilt: 23 Sayı: 69, 67–84. https://doi.org/10.55322/mdbakis.1163170

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