Journals / Muhasebe ve Denetime Bakış / 2024 / Cilt: 23 Sayı: 71

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AVOIDANCE

KURUMSAL YÖNETİMDEN KAÇINMA

Aykut Arslan(PİRİ REİS ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0001-5689-3918
Pages
217–232
Publication Date
2024-01-29
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Findings indicate that Turkey's largest firms' compliance reports are tools for managing corporate governance as a ceremonial feature that priorities must guide to gain prestige and legitimacy in society.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:Corporate governance is an environment of fairness, transparency, accountability, and responsibility that creates a synergy for all shareholders, stakeholders, the public, and management teams.
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Key Findings & Data:Since Berle and Means published their seminal book "The Modern Corporation and Private Property" in 1932, separating ownership and control into different hands has been prioritized and has become one of the most critical issues.
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Conclusion & Impact:Findings indicate that Turkey's largest firms' compliance reports are tools for managing corporate governance as a ceremonial feature that priorities must guide to gain prestige and legitimacy in society.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Kurumsal yönetim · uyum · yeni kurumsal kuram

Abstract

Corporate governance is an environment of fairness, transparency, accountability, and responsibility that creates a synergy for all shareholders, stakeholders, the public, and management teams. Its origin is based on the principle of separation of ownership and control in organizations. Through its application, companies build trust in their stakeholders. Since Berle and Means published their seminal book "The Modern Corporation and Private Property" in 1932, separating ownership and control into different hands has been prioritized and has become one of the most critical issues. The increasing importance of corporate governance principles and the endeavour of company compliance take the attention of academicians and practitioners. The paper will challenge the compliance of Turkish companies in an emerging market context through three concepts of isomorphism and discuss reputation and legitimacy under the neo-institutional umbrella. The idea behind the discussion is to focus on the dark side of "like-governed companies" and question their intentions. Meanwhile, a theoretical model for evaluating corporate governance compliance and a theoretical model for steering corporate governance compliance will be presented. The paper will examine the avoided corporate governance principles through qualitative data analysis. Findings indicate that Turkey's largest firms' compliance reports are tools for managing corporate governance as a ceremonial feature that priorities must guide to gain prestige and legitimacy in society.

Özet

Kurumsal yönetim, adillik, şeffaflık, hesap verebilirlik ve sorumluluk ilkeleriyle örgütlenmiş bir dünyada tüm hissedarlar, menfaat sahipleri, kamuoyu ve yönetim ekipleri için sinerji yaratan bir uygulama bileşimidir. Kökeni, kuruluşların mülkiyetinin ve kontrolünün ayrılması ilkesine dayanmaktadır. Bu uygulama sayesinde şirketler tüm paydaşları nezdinde güven inşa etmektedirler. Adolf Berle ve Gardiner Means'in 1932 yılında yayınladığı başyapıtları “Modern Şirket ve Özel Mülkiyet” ile mülkiyet ve kontrol fonksiyonlarının farklı erklerde bulunması hususu önceliklenmiş ve en kritik konulardan biri olmuştur. Kurumsal yönetim ilkelerinin artan önemi ve şirketlerin bu ilkelere uyum sağlama çabaları akademisyenlerin ve uygulayıcıların ilgisini çekmektedir. Makale, gelişmekte olan bir ekonominin parçası konumundaki Türk şirketlerinin kurumsal yönetim ilkelerine uyumunu, Yeni Kurumsal Kuram’ım şemsiyesi altında, kurumsal eşbiçimliliğin üç kavramı aracılığıyla sorgulayacak, meşruiyet ve itibar yönetimi üzerinden tartışacaktır. Tartışmanın ana fikri, kurumsal yönetim ilkelerine uyumdan kaçınılan, karanlıkta kalan bir tarafa odaklanmak ve ilkelere uyuyor(muş) gibi görünen şirketlerin amaçlarını sorgulamaktır. Bununla birlikte kurumsal yönetim ilkelerine olan uyumu değerlendirmek ve kurumsal yönetimin yönlendirilmesine dair teorik birer model sunulacaktır. Metodolojik olarak kurumsal yönetime uyumdan kaçınılan ilkelerine odaklanılacak ve nitel veri analizi yöntemi uygulanacaktır. Türkiye'nin en büyük firmalarının uyum raporlarındaki bulgular, kurumsal yönetimin, firmaların önceliğine göre toplumda itibar ve meşruiyet kazanmak için yönlendirilen törensel bir araç olarak yönetildiğini göstermektedir.

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Cite This Article

Şahinoğlu, Ö. Ş., Arslan, A. (2024). CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AVOIDANCE. Muhasebe ve Denetime Bakış, Cilt: 23 Sayı: 71, 217–232. https://doi.org/10.55322/mdbakis.1335514

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