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Journals / Kafkas Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi / 2026 / Cilt: 17 Sayı: 33

REFINING STRUCTURAL REALISM: RESTORING PARSIMONY TO THE LOGIC OF AGGRESSION

YAPISAL REALİZMİ İYİLEŞTİRME: SALDIRGANLIK MANTIĞINA SADELİĞİ GERİ KAZANDIRMAK

Celil Yiğit0000-0002-9611-5632
Pages
272–293
Publication Date
2026-06-28
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Aggression occurs when the "Latent Hierarchy" of the system weakens, allowing actors to cross the "Capability Threshold." By redefining the structural conditions of action, this framework offers a unified, parsimonious explanation for both the imperial overreach of Great Powers and the opportunistic aggression of regional powers during systemic transitions.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:Structural Realism has long struggled with two critical explanatory deficits: the puzzle of "unnecessary wars" waged by Great Powers that seemingly contradict rational security calculations, and the theory’s inability to systematically account for aggression initiated by Secondary Units without resorting to unit-level variables.
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Key Findings & Data:It introduces Global-Level Realism (GLR), a framework that replaces the rational actor assumption with an "Irrational Actor" driven by the physical imperatives of a systemic "Natural Substrate".
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Conclusion & Impact:Aggression occurs when the "Latent Hierarchy" of the system weakens, allowing actors to cross the "Capability Threshold." By redefining the structural conditions of action, this framework offers a unified, parsimonious explanation for both the imperial overreach of Great Powers and the opportunistic aggression of regional powers during systemic transitions.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Yapısal realizm · küresel seviyeden realizm · saldırganlık

Abstract

Structural Realism has long struggled with two critical explanatory deficits: the puzzle of "unnecessary wars" waged by Great Powers that seemingly contradict rational security calculations, and the theory’s inability to systematically account for aggression initiated by Secondary Units without resorting to unit-level variables. The dominant scholarly response, Neoclassical Realism, attempts to bridge these gaps by incorporating domestic factors, yet this comes at the cost of sacrificing the theory’s defining virtue: parsimony. This article argues that Structural Realism can resolve the aggression puzzle without abandoning parsimony by elevating the level of analysis from the systemic to the Global Level. It introduces Global-Level Realism (GLR), a framework that replaces the rational actor assumption with an "Irrational Actor" driven by the physical imperatives of a systemic "Natural Substrate". GLR posits that states struggle not merely for security, but for "Peace" (Pax)—defined as the imposition of order. Aggression occurs when the "Latent Hierarchy" of the system weakens, allowing actors to cross the "Capability Threshold." By redefining the structural conditions of action, this framework offers a unified, parsimonious explanation for both the imperial overreach of Great Powers and the opportunistic aggression of regional powers during systemic transitions.

Özet

Yapısal Realizm, uzun süredir iki temel açıklayıcı eksiklikle mücadele etmektedir: Büyük Güçlerin güvenlik maksimizasyonuyla çelişen "gereksiz savaşları" ve Büyük Güçler dışındaki İkincil Birimlerin saldırganlık davranışlarını açıklamadaki yetersizliği. Literatürdeki baskın yanıt olan Neoklasik Realizm, bu boşlukları birim düzeyinde değişkenler ekleyerek kapatmaya çalışmış, ancak bu süreçte yapısal teorinin en güçlü yanı olan "sadelik" ilkesinden ödün vermiştir. Bu makale, birim düzeyine inmeden, analiz seviyesini Küresel Seviyeye taşıyarak Yapısal Realizmin açıklama gücünün artırılabileceğini öne sürmektedir. Çalışma, Küresel Seviyeden Realizm (GLR) adını verdiği yeni bir çerçeve sunar. Bu çerçeve, rasyonel aktör varsayımını, uluslararası sistemin "Doğa Düzeni" tarafından güdülenen ve entropi yasalarına tabi olan "İrrasyonel/Hata Yapan Aktör" varsayımıyla değiştirir. Teoriye göre devletler sadece güvenlik değil, "Barış" (Pax/Düzen) arayışındadır. Saldırganlık, bir devletin İmkan Barajını aşması ve sistemdeki Gizli Hiyerarşinin zayıflaması sonucu ortaya çıkan yapısal bir zorunluluktur. Makale, bu çerçeveyi kullanarak hem Büyük Güçlerin emperyal aşırılıklarını hem de bölgesel güçlerin revizyonist hamlelerini, iç politikaya başvurmadan, tutarlı bir yapısal mantıkla açıklamaktadır.

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Cite This Article

Yiğit, C. (2026). REFINING STRUCTURAL REALISM: RESTORING PARSIMONY TO THE LOGIC OF AGGRESSION. Kafkas Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 17 Sayı: 33, 272–293. https://doi.org/10.36543/kauiibfd.2026.013

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